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SUMMARY
This dissertation is a comprehensive study of financial slack’s roles in municipal
finance. Drawing theories and hypotheses in various fields of disciplines, the dissertation
explores both the causes and impacts of financial slack accumulation in municipal
government. Based on organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis, I first examine
whether tax revenue volatility along with other risk factors in a city’s fiscal structure
increase municipal financial slack accumulation. Using the generalized method-ofmoment estimation, I analyze a panel dataset composed of 2,160 individual American
cities in 50 states from years 2003 to 2011. The findings that tax revenue volatility and
other risk factors increase municipal financial slack accumulation provide evidence to
support organization theorists’ argument that cities that face more risk factors need more
financial slack to hedge against the risks.
I then examine financial slack’s impact on municipal expenditure stabilization.
Using the first-differenced equation model to analyze the same dataset used in the
previous chapter, I find that the change of a city’s accumulated financial slack always
counteracts the change of its expenditures, suggesting that financial slack stabilizes
municipal expenditures when revenues fluctuate—it provides fungible financial resources
when a city faces a revenue shortfall and it absorbs additional revenues when a city
experiences a revenue surplus. Further, the findings indicate that financial slack’s
expenditure stabilization role is more important when a city experiences revenue
shortfalls. These findings support organization theory’s view on financial slack that it
works as an effective tool to manage risks and fluctuations in municipal finance.
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Lastly, I examine financial slack’s role in managing municipal cash flows.
Municipal governments often use internal financial resources (i.e. accumulated financial
slack) and external financial resources (i.e. short-term debt) to manage cash flow
fluctuations. The pecking order theory posits that firms have a preference order over
financial resources: internal funds come first, followed by debt, and then equity. I extend
the application of pecking order theory from firms to local governments and test whether
municipal governments also have this preference order. I use the Heckman Selection
Model to analyze 478 California cities between 2003 and 2011. I find that financial slack
reduces both the probability and the amount of municipal short-term debt. This finding
suggests that municipal governments prefer internal financing over external financing.
In all, this dissertation goes beyond the conventional research focus on financial
slack—its expenditure stabilization role. The dissertation examines both the causes and
impacts of financial slack in municipal finance. Findings from this dissertation provide
evidence to support organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis, improving our
understanding of government financial resources allocation between spending and saving.
Findings from this dissertation also indicate that financial slack is an effective
management tool to smooth expenditure volatility and cash flow fluctuations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: FINANCIAL SLACK IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE

1.1 Managing Municipal Finance in Turbulent Economic Times
In the United States, there are over 19,000 municipalities hosting over 80 percent
of the total population.1 These municipal governments provide local residents with
essential public goods and services such as police and fire protection, electricity, water
and sewage, garbage and sanitation services, public transit systems, and public
recreational facilities. They also serve as local economic engines providing the necessary
infrastructure, safe environment, and educated workforce upon which business flourishes.
Due to the important roles municipal governments, especially cities have played and are
expected to continue playing in the economy, this dissertation is devoted to the study of
American cities.
Financial resources are the lifeblood of public goods and services provisions by
city governments. The availability and stability of public financial resources directly
shape many of the outcomes that matter to the public. Over the past hundred years, as
many American cities have gradually changed their dependence on stable revenue
sources such as the property tax to more volatile revenue sources such as the income and
sales taxes, these cities’ revenues became less predictable. The volatile tax revenues pose
a big challenge to city officials in maintaining the provision and quality of public goods
Sources: “Census Bureau Reports There Are 89,004 Local Governments in the United States.” United
States Census Bureau. Last modified August 30, 2012.
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/governments/cb12-161.html. (Accessed on February
1, 2016). “2010 Census Urban Area Facts.” United States Census Bureau.
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/uafacts.html. (Accessed on February 1, 2016).
1
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and services without disruption. This challenge is greater during turbulent economic
times, especially when the overall economy experiences a recession. During the Great
Recession of 2007-2009, many municipalities experienced increasingly financial stress.
Some cities that experienced extremely severe financial hardship came close to financial
collapse, as illustrated by City of Detroit. To manage municipal finance under fiscal
stress, municipal government managers respond in the following ways: (1) reducing local
services, furloughing or laying off employees; (2) raising taxes, service charges and/or
fees; (3) canceling or delaying infrastructure projects; and/or (4) using accumulated
financial slack to fill in the budget gap (Hoene and Pagano 2011). Reducing local
services and increasing revenues by raising taxes can be politically costly and cause
public dissatisfaction. Canceling or delaying infrastructure projects is simply postponing
the current problems to the future. Financial slack is an alternative tool for city officials
to manage municipal finance in turbulent economic times. Researchers have quite
different views on the accumulation and usage of financial slack by government. In
general, public choice economists portray governments as slack-maximizing and
leviathan-like bureaucracies. They are concerned that accumulated slack might encourage
inefficiency, satisficing, political rent seeking, and agency problems. In contrast,
organization theorists view slack as a crucial buffer against risks. They believe that slack
could increase an organization’s capacity in absorbing shocks and reducing the
disruptions of service delivery or the need for core structural changes.
What roles does financial slack play in municipal finance? What factors affect a
city’s financial slack accumulation? Is slack accumulation driven by governments’ slackmaximizing nature assumed by the public choice theory or a precautionary financial

2

management behavior explained by the organization theory? How does accumulated
slack influence a city’s financial performance regarding expenditure stabilization and
borrowing decisions? This dissertation explores the roles of financial slack in municipal
finance, especially how it works as a financial management tool to help municipal
officials manage their cities’ finances.
1.2 Municipal Financial Slack and Its Measures
1.2.1 Organizational Slack and the Debates
Slack is a concept that appears in various fields of disciplines and has been
developed with reference to firms, governments, nonprofit organizations, and other
institutions. In general, slack is defined as the excess resources available to an
organization, which may include excess liquidity, redundant employees, unused
capacities, discretionary capital expenditures, and public services provided in excess of
those required (Cyert and March 1963). In his book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses
to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Hirschman (1970, 15) argues that slack
exists in any organization such as family, firm, political party, or nation. The human
society has a natural tendency to accumulate slack—slack “is continuously being
generated as a result of some sort of entropy characteristic of human, surplus-producing
societies”.
Organizational slack is anathema to the conventional economic theory. Within
this paradigm, scholars believe that slack represents waste and ideally there should be no
slack. Slack causes price increase with given quality or a quality decline with given price.
This market inefficiency could be corrected through dissatisfied customers’ “exit” that
3

forces firms to reduce slack or through “voice” that attempts to influence management
and/or public opinions (Hirschman 1970). Regarding slack in the public sector, since
Niskanen (1971) published the book Bureaucracy and Representative Government, a
group of public choice economists portray governments as slack-maximizing
bureaucracies. They believe that bureaucrats have the incentive to maximize the
difference between revenue and the minimum cost of production. The difference becomes
slack and it is then turned into over-supply of public goods or non-productive
expenditures that the bureaucrats desire, such as increased salary and benefits, more
administrative expenses, and extra personnel (Breton and Wintrobe 1975; McGuire,
Coiner, and Spancake 1979; Blais and Dion 1990; Wyckoff 1990; Duncombe, Miner, and
Ruggiero, 1997; Garrett 2001). Therefore, taxpayers need to use institutions to constrain
the growth of the “Leviathans” (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Oates 1985; Caplan 2001)
or to introduce competition into the public sector to reduce agency problems (Miranda
1994; Boyne 1998).
The organizational theorists have quite different views compared to the public
choice economists. They argue that when making resource-allocation decisions, shortterm efficiency should not be made without considering the long-term effectiveness.
Organizational slack is a crucial buffer that allows an organization to adapt to internal
pressure for adjustment and external pressure for changes in policies and environment
(Bourgeois 1981). Slack reduces the potential disruptions of services delivery or the need
for core structural changes (Cyert and March 1963; Bourgeois 1981; Sharfman et al.
1988). Slack facilitates innovation by relaxing organizational control and allowing
organizations to experiment with new strategies (Levinthal and March 1981; Singh 1986;
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Bromiley 1991; Nohria and Gulati 1996). Moreover, slack helps organizations to take
advantage of unexpected opportunities (Levinthal and March 1981; Moe 1984).
In this dissertation, I draw theories and studies on slack from various fields of
disciplines and apply them in the context of municipal government. Taking an
organizational perspective, I attempt to explore the effectiveness of financial slack as a
management tool that facilitates municipal government officials in managing their cities’
finances. I am particularly interested in the roles of financial slack (as opposed to nonfinancial slack) which refers to slack resources that are accounting based and can be
measured objectively (Mishina, Pollock, and Porac 2004; Bradley, Shepherd, and
Wiklund 2011) because it is visible, manageable, measurable, and accessible.
1.2.2 Municipal Financial Slack and Its Measures
Financial slack occurs quite often in sub-national governments. For the majority
of the sub-national governments in the United States, one primary feature of their
budgeting and financial management is the balanced budget requirement. Some state
governments require that the governor’s proposed budget must be balanced; some require
the budget that the legislature passes must be balanced; and some require the budget must
be balanced at the end of a fiscal year or biennium, and no deficit should be carried
forward.2 In reality, governments’ actual revenues and expenditures rarely equal their

Source: “Executive Summary on State Balanced Budget Requirements” National Conference of State
Legislature. Updated 12 April, 1999. http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-balanced-budgetrequirements.aspx (accessed on March 14, 2015).
2

In the United States, local government’s authority is granted by its state government. State government
allows certain local discretionary authority, regarding its structure, functions, finances, and personnel
management. The narrowest discretionary powers are given to finances. (See: “Local Government
Authority” National League of Cities http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities101/city-powers/local-government-authority). So far, there is no national survey on municipal adoption of
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estimated numbers in the budgets. In a particular fiscal period (for example a fiscal year),
if a government’s actual revenues exceed actual expenditures, the excess of revenues
over expenditures becomes financial slack. Many governments begin their budget
preparation six months before the start of a new fiscal year; some even earlier (e.g.,
twelve months). Due to the long period between budget preparation and budget
implementation, there inevitably involves some degree of errors in budget estimates. For
example, revenue collections depend on a number of factors such as economic condition,
population growth, employment, intergovernmental aid policies, to name just a few. Each
of these factors is subject to change and can be difficult to estimate accurately.
Expenditure estimation is also based on many factors out of the control of management.
Activities that were planned may not take place. A natural disaster may cause a large
increase in unexpected spending. Whatever the reason, they cause the actual revenues or
expenditures deviate from the estimated numbers. These estimation errors are random
and unintentional.
Budgeters and government officials sometimes build slack into budget estimates
intentionally. Regarding revenue forecasting, researchers find evidence of systematic
underestimation of revenue. For example, Beckett-Camarata (2006) finds that the City of
Canton, Ohio underestimated its tax revenues by an average of 4.7 percent over the
period of 1993 and 1999. The tendency toward underestimating revenues in Canton, Ohio
is not a unique case. A number of studies have found similar evidence of systematic
revenue underestimation in state and local governments (Bretschneider, Bunch, and Gorr

the balanced budget requirement. Given that municipal governments are allowed the narrowest
discretionary powers in their finances, it is reasonable to assume that most of the municipal governments
follow the balanced budget requirement as their state governments do.
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1992; Rodgers and Joyce 1996; Voorhees 2006). This tendency is probably motivated by
a concern of potential shortfalls in actual revenue collection. In terms of expenditure
estimation, budgeters and government officials tend to overestimate expenditures to an
acceptable degree so that once the actual expenditures exceed the budget, they could use
financial slack created by expenditure overestimation to make adjustment instead of
implementing a mid-year cutback or raising taxes which is undesirable both fiscally and
politically. Researchers have found evidence that local governments use the expenditure
overestimation strategy in their budgets. For example, Hulpke and others find that many
school districts in the San Francisco Bay Area overestimated expenditures (Hulpke,
Watne, and Waldo 1976). Larkey and Smith (1989) study budget forecasting in San
Diego, Pittsburgh, and the Pittsburgh School District. They reveal a similar tendency that
on average, these local governments overestimated expenditures by 2 to 3 percent
between the 1940s and the 1980s. Estimation errors caused by intentional revenue
underestimation and expenditure overestimation are called “conservative forecasting
bias” (Mushkin and Lupo 1967; Rose and Smith 2012). The conservative forecasting
biases together with the random estimating errors explain why financial slack often
occurs in municipal government finance.
When financial slack occurs, some governments establish formal funds, such as
rainy day funds, budget stabilization funds, or other types of reserve funds to keep their
financial slack. Almost all state governments have established at least one of such funds
to keep all or a proportion of their financial slack (Thatcher 2008). Unlike state
government, the majority of municipal governments in the U.S. do not have formally
established reserve funds. They seem to prefer keeping financial slack in fund balances
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(Allan 1990). Wolkoff (1987) surveyed 27 largest cities (based on populations) and found
that only 7 of them had a formal rainy day fund during the time of his survey. Marlowe
(2012) updated Wolkoff's survey in a recent study, and found that in 2009, 11 of these 27
cities had a formal rainy fund. However, lacking a formally established rainy day fund or
stabilization fund does not mean that these governments have no financial slack.
Researchers find that many local governments maintain considerable amount of slack in
their fund balances (Marlowe 2005; Hendrick 2006; Stewart 2009; Wang and Hou 2012;
Wang 2015).
Fund balance is the difference between a government’s current assets and current
liabilities at the end of a fiscal year, reflecting what is left over after the fund’s assets
have been used to meet its liabilities. Traditionally, state and local governments report
financial statements arranged around a series of funds in their Comprehensive Annual
Financial Reports (CAFRs). Each fund is a self-balancing account that records specific
aspects of a government’s financial activities. The number of funds a government
operates varies. In general, there are three major categories of funds: governmental funds,
proprietary funds, and fiduciary funds. Proprietary funds are used to account for
activities that are run on a business-like basis, such as an airport owned by a government.
Fiduciary funds contain resources that the government holds for others. Thus money in
fiduciary funds belongs to the ultimate recipient, not the government holding it. Funds in
the fiduciary funds category often include: private purpose trust funds, investment trust
funds, pension funds, and agency funds. Governmental funds account for everything else,
and they are the typical funds operated by most governments. Five funds are included in
the governmental fund types: general fund, special revenue funds, capital projects funds,
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debt service funds, and permanent funds. Among them, the general fund is often the
largest among governmental funds, and it is also where most basic and important public
services can be found, such as police and fire, sanitation, social services, and so on. Some
small municipal governments report most or all transactions in the general fund. Due to
the importance of the general fund in municipal finance, it receives the most attention and
scrutiny from elected officials, citizens, credit rating agencies, and capital market
analysts. The structure of major funds operated by state and local governments is
demonstrated in Figure 1.

Municipal Government

Governmental Funds

Proprietary Funds

General Fund

Enterprise
Fund

Private Purpose
Trust Fund

Internal
Service Fund

Investment
Trust Fund

Special
Revenue Fund

Capital Projects
Fund

Fiduciary Funds

Pension Fund

Agency Fund

Debt Service
Fund

Permanent Fund

Figure 1. The Structure of Major Funds Operated by State and Local Governments
9

Researchers have used various measures of financial slack in their studies,
including cash balance (Gianakis and Snow 2007; Gore 2009), stabilization funds
(Gianakis and Snow 2007; Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015), fund balance
(Hembree, Shelton, and Tyer 1999; Hendrick and Crawford 2014), unreserved general
fund balance (Marlowe 2005; Hendrick 2006), and unrestricted net assets (Marlowe
2011). Cash balance is the end-of-year cash and market securities a government
maintains. Even though cash and market securities represent the most liquid form of
governmental assets, they are not a good measure of a government’s financial slack.
Governments often impose restrictions on their financial resources. A considerable
proportion of cash and securities may be reserved to debt service funds, pension trust
funds, or other types of reserve funds which government managers have no discretionary
authority other than their dedicated purposes. Therefore, if cash and securities carry legal
restrictions, they cannot be considered as slack. In addition, the end-of-year cash and
market securities reported by the Census Bureau include cash balances in the general
fund and all other funds. Using that definition of cash balance as a measure of financial
slack tends to overestimate a government’s discretionary financial capacity in managing
the general fund.
The stabilization fund is not a good measure of municipal financial slack either.
As previously discussed, state governments generally establish formal stabilization funds
or rainy day funds to keep their financial slack; however, very few cities do so. Many city
governments maintain a considerable amount of slack in their fund balances. Therefore,
using stabilization funds or rainy funds may underestimate municipal governments’
financial slack level. In addition, since state laws that regulate local stabilization funds or
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rainy day funds vary tremendously, and more than half of the states have no explicit laws
in this area (Ványolós 2009), these local stabilization funds have different names,
dedications, and deposit/withdrawal rules. The lack of uniformity of local stabilization
funds creates a challenge for conducting a nationwide study.
An alternative measure of financial slack is fund balance, which is the difference
between assets and liabilities of various funds (see Figure 1) reported in the government’s
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs). CAFRs are end-of-year financial
documents that consist of a set of thorough and detailed financial statements of a state,
municipal, or other governmental entities. Information reported in individual CAFRs is
audited by an independent public accounting firm or a state audit elected or appointed by
the state government, usually on an annual basis. The auditing firm or state office
certifies that the financial statements are presented fairly in conformity with the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and are free from material
misstatement. Therefore, financial information reported in CAFRs is generally
considered to be accurate, consistent, comprehensive, and relatively comparable.
Among the various funds governments operate, the general fund is most important
because it is usually the largest fund and includes most of the essential public services.
The general fund balance is often reported as reserved and unreserved fund balance, as
required by the GAAP set by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB).
When the general fund balance is reserved, it means that the resources are legally limited
for particular purposes such as debt service and capital replacement. The reserved general
fund balance should not be considered as a government’s financial slack. If the general
fund balance carries no restrictions on its future use, it is called unreserved general fund
11

balance. The unreserved general fund balance (UFB) thus is an appropriate measure of a
government’s available resources under government officials’ management discretion.
Further, the general fund balance is reported on a modified-accrual basis of accounting
that focuses on short-term or in other words, liquid financial resources. Therefore, the
UFB reflects a government’s available and liquid financial resources for operations.
CAFRs also report the net assets of governmental activities in the governmentwide financial statements.3 The net assets are the difference between a government’s total
assets and total liabilities.4 Like the general fund balance, part of the net assets may be
subject to restrictions beyond government managers’ control. Net assets that carry no
restrictions are call unrestricted net assets (UNA), which researchers sometimes use as a
financial slack measure. The UNA reflects a government’s overall available resources,
both liquid and those inherent in a government’s long-term condition. UNA includes
long-term assets such as land, improvements, and constructions in process that are not
easily converted to liquid financial resources quickly. Using UNA as a financial slack

3

The funds financial statements could barely provide a complete picture of the financial activities and
financial condition of a government. First, these funds use different accounting methods. For example, the
proprietary and fiduciary funds use accrual basis accounting, whereas the governmental funds use the
modified accrual accounting. Second, some financial activities occur between funds. Simply adding funds
together may double-count these activities. To compensate the missing information from the separate funds
financial statements, the GASB Statement 34 requires state and local governments to report the
government-wide statements that bring all financial activities together in one place using one type of
information—information reported under the accrual-based accounting. The government-wide statements
organize information by whether it relates to governmental activities or business-type activities. Generally
speaking, the governmental activities are those accounted for in the governmental funds and the internal
services. The business-type activities are typically synonymous with the enterprise funds. The
governmental and business-type activities combine to represent the total primary government.
4
In June 2011, the GASB renamed “net assets” as “net position” in its Statement No. 65. The Statement No.
65 amends the net assets reporting requirements in the Statement No. 34 by standardizing the presentation
of deferred inflows and outflows of resources. The GASB Statement No. 65 took effect after December 15,
2011. Since the purpose of this section is to review and assess financial slack measures used in prior
studies, I use “net assets” in the discussion to keep consistent. (See “Summary of Statement No. 63”, the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board
http://gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=GASB&c=Pronouncement_C&pagename=GASB%2FPronounceme
nt_C%2FGASBSummaryPage&cid=1176158736800).
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measure may overestimate a government’s immediately available financial resources that
allow government officials’ management discretion in their daily operations. In addition,
UNA is reported based on the accrual basis of accounting. Under the accrual accounting,
revenue is recognized when it is earned, realized or realizable. For example, governments
can report revenues before they receive the cash if they reasonably expect the cash will
be received in the near future. This also suggests that using UNA as a measure tends to
overestimate a government’s liquid and immediately available financial slack. In this
dissertation, I explore how financial slack works as a management tool that offers
government officials discretionary power and the flexibility when managing their cities’
finances in turbulent economic times. For such a study, a financial slack measure that
reflects a government’s liquid and immediately available financial resources is more
appropriate. Therefore, I use unreserved general fund balance (UFB) as the financial
slack measure in this dissertation.
1.3 Research Questions
In the corporate finance and financial management literature, researchers address
why firms accumulate slack and whether slack resources promote or hinder firms’
successful performance (Levinthal and March 1981; Moe 1984, Jensen 1986; Sharfman
et al. 1988; Pasour Jr 1989; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1994; Phan and
Hill 1995; Harford 1999). In the public finance and government financial management
literature, studies on how slack resources influence government finance and financial
management blossomed in the 1990s and early 2000s. These studies almost exclusively
focus on state government (Poterba 1994; Sobel and Holcombe 1996; Knight and
Levinson 1999; Joyce 2001; Hou 2003, 2004; Wagner and Elder 2005; Hou and
13

Duncombe 2008), with a few exceptions on local government, and even fewer on
municipal government (Tyer 1993; Hembree, Shelton, and Tyer 1999; Marlowe 2005;
Hendrick 2006; Gianakis and Snow 2007; Gore 2009; Marlowe 2011; Hendrick and
Crawford 2014; Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015). Table 1 summarizes the empirical
studies on municipal financial slack in last three decades. This table suggests that most of
these studies use samples of cities in one state or a particular metropolitan area, raising a
concern of external validity of the findings. So far, we know relatively little about slack
accumulation by American cities across the nation: what is the national average level of
financial slack accumulated by American cities? Are there any general patterns of
financial slack accumulation among cities in different regions? What are the determinants
of municipal financial slack accumulation? How does financial slack affect municipal
financial management with respect to spending and borrowing? Does financial slack act
as a balancing device that helps stabilize municipal expenditures? Does the accumulated
slack reduce a government’s short-term debt issuance? This dissertation attempts to
address these questions. Drawing from theories and literature in public finance, public
and corporate financial management, economics, and organization and strategic
management, this dissertation explores the roles of financial slack in municipal finance in
two primary perspectives: the determinants of financial slack accumulation and the
impacts of financial slack in municipal finance. I examine these two perspectives in three
chapters that cover municipal revenues (Chapter Two), municipal expenditures (Chapter
Three), and municipal securities (Chapter Four).
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Table 1. Summary of Previous Findings in Municipal Financial Slack

Author

Hembree et al.
(1999)
Marlowe (2005)

Sample
514 cities in North Carolina

Period
1997

89 cities in South Carolina
103 cities in Minnesota

19902000

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

n/a

n/a

27.0%

266.0%a

n/a

n/a

26.0%

151.0%

Unreserved general fund balance/Total
current expenditures

24.5%

42.2%

-68.5%

576.9%

Total general fund balance/Total
current expenditures

53.1%

56.1%

-44.2%

689.0%

Financial Slack Measures
Average fund balance/General fund
expenditures

Hendrick (2006)

264 municipal governments in
the Chicago Metropolitan area

19972003

Unreserved general fund balance/Total
noncapital spending

59.8%

79.6%

n/a

n/a

Gianakis and Snow
(2007)

351 municipal governments in
Massachusetts

19952002

Stabilization fund/Total revenues

6.4%

8.4%

n/a

n/a

Free cash balance/Total revenue

5.9%

5.3%

n/a

n/a

Gore (2009)

9413 municipalities in the
U.S.

19972003

Year-end cash balance/Monthly
operating and interest expenditures

10.4

8.4

n/a

n/a

Hendrick and
Crawford (2014)

265 municipal governments in
the Chicago Metropolitan area

19972009

Fund balance/Total Operating
Spending

82%

88%

-98%

1,564%

Snow et al. (2015)

239 municipal governments in
Massachusetts

19932010

Log of real stabilization fund balance
per capita

147.0

206.0

n/a

n/a

Note: a. For cities that operate their own electric utilities, the minimum and maximum fund-balance-to-expenditure ratios are: 25% and 71%.
b. This table only includes empirical studies on financial slack in municipal governments, excluding studies that focus on other types of local governments
such as counties, school districts, and special districts governments.
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Why do municipal governments accumulate financial slack? Is slack
accumulation driven by governments’ slack-maximizing nature assumed by the public
choice theory or a precautionary financial management behavior explained by the
organization theory? Chapter Two takes an organizational perspective to examine how
risk factors, particularly tax revenue volatility affect a city’s financial slack accumulation.
This chapter first presents an overall picture of municipal financial slack accumulation in
the United States. It then proceeds to explore the determinants of a city’s financial slack
level. In organization theory, slack is viewed as a cushion against risks. An organization
exposed to more risk factors needs more cushion. In municipal governments, the
volatility of tax revenues is a risk factor because it threatens government operations and
the consistency of service provision. According to this theory, municipal governments
with volatile tax revenue streams should accumulate more financial slack. Chapter two
examines how tax revenue volatility and other risk factors in municipal finance affect a
city’s financial slack accumulation.
The next two chapters are devoted to exploring the potential impacts of the
accumulated financial slack on municipal financial performance and management. For
most municipal governments, the primary goal is to provide citizens with essential public
goods and services with good quality that commensurate with the taxes they paid. This
goal is often interrupted by expenditure instability caused by the volatile tax revenues
and/or the business cycles. Due to limited fiscal authority, municipal governments cannot
implement monetary policies or certain types of fiscal policies as the federal government
does. To stabilize expenditures in face of volatile revenues, governments often use
financial slack or issue short-term debt as budget-balancing devices. Most state
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governments have established formal funds for the purpose of expenditure stabilization.
Unlike state governments, municipal governments more often rely on financial slack
stored in the form of unreserved general fund balance (UFB) to manage expenditure
fluctuations. Chapter Three examines financial slack’s expenditure stabilization role in
municipal finance.
Chapter Four explores the other budget-balancing and cash flow management
device—short-term debt. All governments face the challenge of day-to-day cash flow
problem. A mismatch between cash flow-ins and flow-outs can cause temporary cash
shortfalls in a government’s daily operations. To smooth the temporary deficit, municipal
governments can use either internal resources such as financial slack or external
resources such as short-term borrowing if their state governments do not prohibit local
short-term debt financing. If a municipal government has the option to use either tool,
which one will it prefer? Chapter Four applies the pecking order theory in the
management and corporate finance literature and examines whether municipal
governments also have a pecking order preference when choosing between internal
financing (using financial slack) and external financing (using short-term debt) in their
financial management. The primary research question is: does financial slack reduce
municipal short-term borrowing? Using the Heckman selection model, this chapter tests
the following hypotheses: (1) financial slack reduces a municipal government’s
probability to issue short-term debt; and (2) municipal governments with more financial
slack tend to issue less short-term debt.
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1.4 Potential Contributions
This dissertation is a comprehensive study of financial slack in municipal finance.
Drawing literature broadly from different disciplines, this dissertation examines both the
factors that affect municipal financial slack accumulation and the impacts of accumulated
slack on municipal expenditures and short-term borrowing. The research is designed to
cover three key areas of municipal finance: municipal revenues; municipal expenditures;
and, municipal securities. This dissertation extends the scope of studies on slack
accumulation from U.S. state governments to local governments, specifically, municipal
governments. The empirical analysis is based on data from multiple sources. The sample
includes cities of fifty states over periods of economic upturns and downturns. Results are
thus expected to have greater external validity. This dissertation contributes to the
increasing literature on municipal financial slack accumulation, local counter-cyclical
expenditure stabilization, and municipal short-term debt financing. Findings from this
study will shed light on the roles of financial slack in municipal finance and financial
management. This dissertation is expected to improve our understanding of managing
financial slack accumulation and using financial slack as a management tool to achieve
better outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2
TAX REVENUE VOLATILITY AND MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL SLACK
ACCUMULATION
2.1 Introduction
How much money municipal governments have saved may concern taxpayers.
Excessive slack accumulation may indicate that taxpayers are either paying unnecessarily
high taxes or other charges, or they are not receiving an adequate return on their tax
dollars in service and facilities. Insufficient savings on the other hand, may leave
government managers too little financial flexibility to respond to unanticipated events,
leading to possible disruptions of service delivery or frequent changes of tax rates. So far,
there is no universally accepted optimal financial slack level. Many government officials
follow rules of thumb to manage and evaluate their governments’ financial slack
accumulation. A commonly cited standard recommends that governments should
maintain rainy day funds approximately five percent of general fund expenditures.
Although there is no clear indication of the original source of this recommendation, the
‘five-percent rule’ is often cited as the adequate size of the rainy day funds (Joyce 2001).
Credit rating firms also seem to support this ‘five-percent rule’ by citing it in the rating
criteria (Seymour 2014). The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) does
not agree that the ‘five-percent rule’ should apply to all municipal governments. In their
recommended ‘best practices’, the ‘five-percent rule’ fits only the needs of very large
municipalities while for the majority of municipal governments, the appropriate
benchmark is an unrestricted general fund balance of no less than fifteen percent (or two
months) of regular general fund operating revenues or expenditures (Gauthier 2009).
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Empirical research on municipal financial slack accumulation reveals that cities in
the United States maintain financial slack at much higher levels than the recommended
benchmarks. In addition, the financial slack levels vary considerably among these cities
(see Table 1). What contributes to the variations of municipal financial slack levels?
What determines a city’s financial slack accumulation? Kriz (2002, 2003) identifies four
major drivers of financial slack accumulation: revenue growth, revenue volatility, desired
expenditure growth, and the interest earned on invested fund balances. In the economic
and management literature, volatility is analogous to the concept of risk. Organization
theorists, following Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality concept (1947) and Cyert and
March’s seminal work A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963), argue that risk can be
hedged against by organizational slack. Slack provides an organization the flexibility to
respond to uncertainties. It increases an organization’s capacity in absorbing fluctuations
and reduces the potential disruptions of service delivery or the need for core structural
changes (Cyert and March 1963; Bourgeois 1981; Sharfman et al. 1988). If their
argument holds, organizations that face more risk factors should accumulate more slack.
This chapter of the dissertation tests this argument by examining how risk factors,
especially tax revenue volatility affect a city's financial slack level. It is one of the few
studies that use a nationwide sample of cities to study the determinants of municipal
savings. Findings from this chapter offer a new perspective to view municipal tax
portfolios and their impact on municipal finance. This chapter also sheds light on the
determinants of municipal financial slack accumulation, providing empirical evidence to
move the current understanding of slack accumulation beyond the simple rules of thumb,
such as the ‘five-percent’ rule.
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This chapter proceeds in six sections: following the first section of introduction,
section two analyzes the causes and costs of tax revenue volatility, ways to management
volatility, and its measures. Section three introduces data sources, describes the national
sample, and presents an overview of financial slack accumulation by American cities.
Section four introduces the variables, presents a model of municipal financial slack
accumulation, and explains the appropriate methods for the analysis. The last two
sections interpret empirical results and outline the implication of this work for the theory
and practices of municipal financial management.
2.2 Managing and Measuring Tax Revenue Volatility
2.2.1 The Causes and Costs of Tax Revenue Volatility
Governments generally arrange their activities based on the amount of revenues
they expect to receive. In most municipal governments, the primary own-source revenues
that support general government activities are taxes. Municipal governments draw tax
revenues from a variety of local economic activities. Therefore, tax revenues are largely
driven by economic growth. Researchers use volatility to describe the extent to which tax
revenues fluctuate over the course of business cycles (Felix 2008). The traditional view
of tax specialists argues that there is an inherent trade-off between revenue growth and
volatility (Groves and Kahn 1952). According to this view, some taxes are more sensitive
to economic changes, such as corporate income tax, personal income tax, and sales taxes.
These taxes tend to grow faster than the economy but fluctuate more over the business
cycles, causing tax revenues to be unstable (Groves and Kahn 1952; Wilford 1965; White
1983; Felix 2008). Nevertheless, recent studies show that the trade-off between growth
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and volatility is not as acute as was once thought. Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) find that
the combination of tax base, rate structures, and policies have a bigger impact on tax
revenue volatility than tax types.
Tax revenue volatility causes undesirable consequences in government and the
overall economy. From a government management perspective, unstable tax revenues
lead to unsustainable expenditures and/or frequent changes in tax rates, which adds to the
challenge of governmental budgeting and financial management. From the
macroeconomic perspective, volatile tax revenues intensify the business cycles. During
economic growth, spending increase and tax cuts add force to booms; whereas during
economic downturn, spending cuts and tax increase deepen cyclical busts (Poterba 1995;
Levinson 1998; Thompson and Gates 2007). Economists also use the ‘feedback loop’ to
describe the interaction of tax revenue volatility and the business cycles. On one hand,
economic shocks lead to tax revenue volatility through the impacts on wages, profits, and
consumption; on the other hand, volatile tax revenues increase the uncertainty of
government expenditures and tax policies, leading to increased uncertainty for firms and
consumers.
2.2.2 Managing Tax Revenue Volatility
Local governments face more challenges to soften revenue volatility in the
business cycles, because they have relatively limited fiscal authority compared to the
federal government and they are restricted from implementing monetary policy or certain
kinds of fiscal policies as the federal government does. Nevertheless, modern financial
and management theories provide some tools for local government to manage tax revenue
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volatility. Researchers decompose volatility into unsystematic volatility and systematic
volatility (Thompson and Gates 2007). The former refers to random volatility which can
be partially managed through revenue diversification; the latter reflects changes in
accordance with the economic conditions which can be managed through hedging and
buffering strategies.
Effective revenue diversification is widely accepted as a way of reducing revenue
volatility. This idea originates from the modern portfolio theory proposed by Harry
Markowitz (1952). The insight of this theory is that portfolio volatility is determined by
the covariance of individual securities’ risks (also called volatility). An investor can
reduce portfolio risk by holding the combination of securities that are not perfectly
positively correlated. The modern portfolio theory encourages scholars in public finance
to shift their focus from the volatility of individual taxes to the appropriate tax structure
or tax portfolio—the mix of taxes within a governmental jurisdiction. They find that the
volatility of a tax portfolio depends on how each tax co-varies with each other in a tax
structure (White 1983; Gentry and Ladd 1994). A government can reduce the overall tax
revenue volatility or even diversify away volatility by carefully selecting a combination
of taxes with varying degrees of volatility. Such an overall tax structure would have to
include taxes that were not perfectly correlated, so that the impact of revenue decline
from one tax on the overall tax revenues is minimized because other taxes would not
change in the same direction. This view differs substantially from the traditional view
that greater revenue growth is inherently associated with greater volatility in tax
revenues. It provides a strong theoretical foundation for the revenue diversification
practice in government.
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Tools to manage the second component of volatility—the systematic volatility—
include hedging and buffering strategies. The hedging strategies refer to using revenue
flows of the same size and opposite volatility to offset the loss the other revenue. This
strategy is conceptually similar to the use of futures and options contracts. Currently, a
number of states, municipalities, and public retirement systems have used financial
derivatives to hedge against budgetary risk, such as Texas’ government hedging program
on natural gas revenues (Bowsher 1994; Swidler, Buttimer, and Shaw 1999; Thompson
and Gates 2007).
The buffering strategies refer to using accumulated financial slack as a financial
management tool. When tax revenue growth exceeds economic growth, the excess of
revenues are kept as financial slack, preventing excessive expenditure growth in
economic boom years; when a revenue shortfall occurs, the accumulated financial slack
fills in the gap, buffering against the need of spending cuts or tax increase. As argued by
O’Toole and Meier, financial slack “protect(s) their organizational systems from
unanticipated and unpleasant disruptions to maintain performance in the face of
adversity” (2010, 342). Compared to those hedging strategies such as using financial
derivatives, using financial slack to manage budgetary risk is more common among U.S.
local governments and has a longer history.
2.2.3 Measuring Tax Revenue Volatility
Conceptually, tax revenue volatility is similar to the variance of revenues over
time. Groves and Kahn (1952) estimate tax revenue volatility by regressing log tax on log
income. The coefficient on log income measures revenue-income elasticity. Larger values
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of the elasticity coefficient indicate greater volatility. Researchers later pointed out that
Groves and Kahn’s coefficient is more of a measure of long-run growth rather than
volatility which refers to short-run behavior (Williams et al. 1973; Dye and Merriman
2004). For example, a government with a rapidly growing population will have a large
revenue-income elasticity coefficient suggesting large over-time revenue volatility, even
though its year-to-year tax yields have little fluctuation. To capture the year-to-year
revenue fluctuation, White (1983) measures volatility by the degree to which the actual
revenue differs from the predicted revenue. The predicted revenue is assumed to follow a
linear trend and can be estimated with simple econometric forecast by regressing revenue
on time. Although these forecasts may not be unbiased estimates of actual municipal tax
revenues, they may be reasonable proxies (Dye and Merriman 2004). In practice,
budgeters and legislators usually base their revenue estimation on typical growth patterns
in tax revenues. In other words, local government budgeting is based on the assumption
of predicable and steady growth over time, which is also called budget incrementalism.
Furthermore, the underlying economic conditions (generally measured by gross state
product or gross regional product) where tax revenues are based on tend to grow at a
close to constant rate. Therefore, the predicated tax revenues could be considered as a
function of time trend, and estimated from the following regression:
𝑅̂
𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡

(1)

Due to the concern of negatively skewed distribution of tax revenues in the
dataset and for the convenience of interpretation, I convert tax revenues into the natural
logarithmic form before running the regression. 𝑅̂
𝑖,𝑡 is therefore the predicated natural
logarithm of total tax revenues for city i in year t; 𝛼𝑖 is the constant for city i; 𝛽𝑖 is the
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linear trend parameter for city i; t is the time variable indicating year; and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the
random error term. The regression is estimated using city and year fixed effects with state
dummy variables to control for unobservable across-city and across-state differences and
time-invariant factors.
Tax revenue volatility is then calculated from the absolute deviations between the
actual and predicated log of total tax revenues divided by the predicated log of total tax
revenues expressed in the following model:

𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =

|𝑅̂
𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 |
× 100
𝑅̂
𝑖,𝑡

(2)

As such, this volatility measure captures the short-run variability of the tax
revenues for city i in year t around its own growth trend in revenues. Greater value
indicates greater volatility. This volatility measure is well accepted and often used in
studies on revenue or expenditure volatility (Marlowe 2005; Carroll 2009; Wang and Hou
2009). I use short-run volatility measure to study the impacts of tax revenue volatility on
municipal financial slack accumulation for two reasons: first, the dissertation focuses on
liquid and immediately available financial slack, which provides municipal government
officials’ flexibility to cope with challenges when managing their cities’ finances. The
research questions addressed are mostly management issues that are short-run focused.
Second, the time span of the dataset is nine years. It is not appropriate to calculate longrun volatility measures based on this relatively short time period. In the next section, I
introduce the data sources for this study, basic descriptions of the sample, and some
statistics of municipal financial slack accumulation.
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2.3 Data Sources, Sample Descriptions, and an Overview of Financial Slack
Accumulation by American Cities
2.3.1 Data Sources
Most studies on municipal financial slack use samples of cities in one or two
states or in a particular metropolitan area as shown in Table 1. One possible obstacle that
prevents researchers from conducting a nationwide study on municipal financial slack is
data availability. The unreserved general fund balance (UFB) is reported in municipal
governments’ Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs). Not every state
requires their local governments to prepare and report audited CAFRs that comply with
GAAP; and not every city that prepares CAFRs makes them publicly accessible.
Therefore, it is difficult for researchers to compile the CAFR-based information of local
governments across the nation.
Luckily, the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) has been
collecting key data elements from CAFRs submitted by governmental entities for its
Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting Award Program
(CAFR Program) in its Financial Indicators database since 1995. A governmental entity
is eligible for the CAFR Program if its CAFR complies with the GAAP and includes all
funds and component units, regardless of the entity’s size and financial condition.
Therefore, governmental entities included in the GFOA’s Financial Indicators database
are not necessarily in better financial positions or larger in size because the eligibility
requirements of this award program focus on the quality of CAFR reporting. Since all
governmental entities in the Financial Indicators database use the same accounting basis,
financial information in this database is more consistent and comparable than any other
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publicly available source. The average number of award-winning municipal governments
included in this database is over 1,900 in the recent three fiscal years (fiscal years 2012 to
2014).5
The GFOA’s Financial Indicators database provides key information on
municipal financial slack and total revenues and expenditures in the general fund. It does
not report detailed revenues by source, expenditures by functions, debt outstanding, and
cash and investment positions. The U.S. Census Bureau collects and reports such
information in its State & Local Government Finances database. The Census Bureau has
surveyed state and local governments annually since 1967. The Census Bureau conducts
a census every five years (years ending in ‘2’ and ‘7’), and surveys a sample of state and
local governments in the intervening years. The financial information reported in the
Census Bureau’s State & Local Government Finances database reflects all governmental
activities. This is different from the fund financial statements in CAFRs that only report
financial activities within each fund (e.g. the general fund).
2.3.2 Sample Descriptions
In order to create a panel dataset that includes both the financial slack information
and details of revenues, expenditures, and debt, I merge the GFOA’s Financial Indicator
database with the Census State & Local Government Finances database. I use ‘municipal
name’ in the same state as the identifier and ‘population’ as the verifier to match cities in
the two databases. The time span of this study is from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2011

Source: Government Finance Officers Association. “Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in
Financial Reporting Program (CAFR Program).” http://www.gfoa.org/coa (accessed on February 5, 2016).
5
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in order to avoid potential inconsistency of the financial slack measure.6 The combined
dataset includes 15,980 observations of cities in all fifty states of nine fiscal years. I
check for missing observations and obvious data entry errors for those variables which
will be used in later analysis. Instead of excluding missing observations in the analysis, I
obtain information from available sources to fill in the missing values. For example, for
the 17 cities with missing population, I am able to find the population information for 10
of them from the statistical sections in their CAFRs or from the Census’ or their
governments’ websites. For the rest of the 7 observations, I fill in the missing cells with
the average population of the prior and the following years.
To check for potential data entry errors, I examine those observations whose total
general fund revenues, total general fund expenditures, unreserved general fund balances,
and populations have changed by over 100 percent from year t-1 to year t. I identify over
200 of such observations. I then compare the values of the above four variables reported
in the Financial Indicators database and the numbers reported in the CAFRs that I obtain
from those cities’ websites. Except for a few cities that actually experienced significant
changes in revenues, expenditures, UFB, and population due to fund balance transfers,
municipal consolidation, and many other reasons, most of the identified cases involve
data entry errors. The primary cause of data entry errors is mistreating dollar value with

6

GASB Statement No. 54 changed the reporting requirements on general fund balance, effective from
2012. Prior to this change, the general fund was reported ‘as reserved’, ‘designated’, and ‘unreserved.’ The
Statement No. 54 requires that fund balance should be reported as ‘non-spendable’, ‘restricted’,
‘committed’, ‘assigned’, and ‘unassigned.’ The new fund balance categories are not directly compatible
with the old categories. For example, the sum of committed, assigned, and unassigned fund balances under
the new reporting system does not necessarily equal the unreserved fund balance under the old reporting
system, because some proportion of the committed or the assigned fund balances might be reserved
depending on different accounting treatments. To keep the UFB measures consistent, I restrict the time
period between fiscal years 2003 and 2011.
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thousands of dollar value, or vice versa. I replace the wrong data entries with correct
information reported in their CAFRs, rather than to exclude these observations as some
researchers did (Marudas 2004; Gore 2009; Calabrese 2011). I delete 22 observations
with missing values or data entry errors that I could not obtain information to correct
them. After data cleaning, the combined dataset comprises an unbalanced panel of 15,958
observations for 2,160 individual cities with an average 7.4 years of data points.
The combined dataset biases towards larger cities. As is shown in Table 2, my
GFOA and Census combined dataset includes almost exclusively urban cities. Therefore,
findings from this chapter should not be generalized to all cities, but larger urban cities in
the United States. This fact does not devalue this combined dataset and this study because
larger cities serve larger populations, and research findings from samples of larger urban
cities may potentially inform fiscal decision making that affect more people.
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Table 2. Comparing the Sizes of Cities in the Databases (Fiscal Year 2010)
GFOA Database

Census Database

GFOA & Census Combined

Total Observations

1,863

3,512

1,861

Population Range

Min: 58 Max: 8,391,881

Min: 1 Max: 8,274,527

Min: 58 Max: 8,391,881

% of Rural Townsa (Popu<2,500)

1%

20%

1%

% of Urban Citiesb (Popu>=2,500)

99%

80%

99%

% of Urban Clusters (Popu: 2,500 ~50,000)

67%

62%

67%

% of Urbanized Areasa (Popu>=50,000)

32%

18%

32%

Mean Population of All Cities

71,575

41,136

71,798

Mean Population of Urban Cities

72,596

51,222

72,638

a

a.
b.

U.S. Census Bureau’s definition. Source: http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_urbanrural.html. Accessed on March 7, 2015.
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s definition. Source: Source: http://ric.nal.usda.gov/what-is-rural. Accessed on March 7, 2015.
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2.3.3 An Overview of Financial Slack Accumulation by American Cities
Before proceeding to explore the factors that affect a city’s financial slack
accumulation, I first present some descriptive statistics to show an overall picture of
financial slack accumulation by American cities. I use unreserved general fund balance
(UFB) as a percentage of total current expenditures to measure a city’s financial slack
level. Figure 2 illustrates the trend of financial slack accumulation by the 2,160 cities of
fifty states throughout the study period in my sample. The trend demonstrates a clear procyclical pattern: during economic expansion (fiscal years 2003 - 2007),7 cities increased
their financial slack levels, and the accumulated UFB peaked when the economy reached
its summit in 2007. The UFB drained away quickly in the Great Recession of 2007-2009.
When the U.S. economy recovered from recession, the UFB accumulation slowly
recovered as well. On average, during the nine years of economic ups and downs,
American cities in the sample maintained UFB about 21 percent of their total current
expenditures (or equal to 2.5 months of total current expenditures). This national average
financial slack level is close to but slightly above the GFOA’s recommended benchmarks
(i.e. 15 percent or two months of operating expenditures). This finding is comparable to
Marlowe (2005)’s finding of 24.5 percent based on a sample of Minnesota cities.

Source: The National Bureau of Economic Research. “US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.”
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html.Accessed on January 15, 2015.
7
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UFB as a percent of Total Current Expenditures

Ten-Year Average Financial Slack Accumulation
Mean: 21.0%
Std. Dev.: 47.7%
Source: the combined GFOA and Census dataset (author’s calculation)

Figure 2. Overall Trend of Municipal Financial Slack Accumulation by American Cities
(UFB%)

Prior studies have found that smaller cities tend to have higher financial slack
levels (Hendrick 2006; Marlowe 2012). To examine the relationship between city size
(measured by population) and financial slack levels, I group cities by population quartiles
and by key city definitions according to the Census Bureau and the United States
Department of Agriculture. Results in Figure 3 and Figure 4 are consistent with findings
in prior studies: on average during the study period, small cities (cities that fall into the
first quartile) maintained financial slack level over twice as high as the financial slack
levels in large cities (cities that fall into the fourth quartile); rural towns kept financial
slack levels over five times higher than those in urbanized areas.
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UFB as a Percentage of Total Current
Expenditures
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Figure 3. Municipal Financial Slack (UFB%) and City Size (by Population Quartile)
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Figure 4. Municipal Financial Slack (UFB%) and City Size (by City Definition)
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Geography matters for economic activities, which is the central idea of economic
geography. Cities in the same region may have similar climate, natural resources,
economic activities, industries, political and fiscal institutions, and population density, to
name a few. The shared similarities in the above factors may lead to commonly shared
municipal financial management practices in the same regions. To examine whether cities
in the same region show any pattern in slack accumulation, I segment the United States
into eight economic regions following the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s
definition. The BEA’s definition of regions is primarily based on cross-sectional
similarities in their socioeconomic characteristics, and thus is appropriate for this study.
Figure 5 illustrates the eight major economic regions in the United States. Analysis of
municipal financial slack accumulation and economic regions reveals some interesting
patterns. Figure 6 shows that cities in the New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, and VT)
and the Mideast (DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, and PA) regions8 accumulate far less financial
slack than cities in the rest of the United States. On average, cities in the Southwest
region (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, and WV) have the highest
financial slack levels, almost three times as much as those in the New England region.

8

Altogether, the two regions are called the Northeast Region by the Census Bureau.
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Source: “Bureau of Economic Analysis Regions” Iowa State University’s website
http://www.icip.iastate.edu/maps/refmaps/bea (accessed on April 7, 2016).

Figure 5. Eight Major Economic Regions in the United States
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UFB as A Percentage of Total Current Expenditures
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Figure 6. Municipal Financial Slack (UFB%) and Economic Regions

The above descriptive information suggests that municipal financial slack levels
are affected by the overall economic condition, city size, and some observable and
unobservable regional factors. Besides these, what else contribute to the variation of
municipal financial slack accumulation? In the next section, I present a model of
municipal financial slack accumulation, and discuss the appropriate methods for the
regression analysis.
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2.4 Variables and Model Specification
Organization theorists view slack resources as a crucial buffer against risks. Slack
increases an organization’s capacity in absorbing fluctuations. It gives managers more
administrative flexibility to respond to uncertainties, risks, and goal conflicts among
political coalitions (Cyert and March 1963; Levinthal and March 1981; Moe 1984;
Sharfman et al. 1988). This view explains the rationale that organizations accumulate
financial slack. Organizations that face more risk factors need to accumulate more
financial slack in order to have the capacity to respond to potential uncertainties and
risks. Managers in such organizations are motivated to accumulate financial slack to
increase their management flexibility. Built on this risk-slack hypothesis, the model of
municipal financial slack accumulation incorporates tax revenue volatility as the
independent variable and several control variables that are hypothesized to affect a city's
financial slack accumulation. The primary research question is: does greater tax revenue
volatility lead to more financial slack accumulation in American cities?
2.4.1 Variables
The dependent variable is UFB as a percentage of total current expenditures,
labeled as “Slacki,t.” This variable reflects the amount of immediately available and
fungible financial resources of an individual city i in year t. These financial resources are
under municipal government officials’ discretionary power when they manage their
cities’ finances. The independent variable—tax revenue volatility—is calculated from
equation (2) which reflects a city’s short-run variability of the total tax revenues in a
particular year. This variable is labeled as “Volatilityi,t.”
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In addition to tax revenue volatility which is expected to increase a city’s
financial slack accumulation, risk (or protective) factors inherent in a city’s fiscal
structure are also taken into account in the model. On the revenue side, over dependence
on intergovernmental revenues is a risk factor because the amount of aid and the time of
aid disbursements are not under the control of municipal government officials
(Reschovsky 2004; Hendrick 2006). To make things worse, state and county
governments often reduce the amount of aid or delay aid disbursements to deal with their
own fiscal stress during economic recessions when municipal governments are in greater
need of such revenues (Hoene 2009). I use the percentage of revenues received from state
and county governments out of total municipal revenues to measure this factor. I
hypothesize that cities with greater dependence on intergovernmental revenues are likely
to accumulate more financial slack. This variable is labeled as “IG Revenuei,t.”
In contrast, revenue diversification is often advocated as a risk-reduction financial
management strategy. The common approach to measuring revenue diversification is to
use a reversed Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Hendrick 2002; Carroll 2005, 2009; Yan
2012). I calculate this index based on three major revenue sources: total tax revenues,
total intergovernmental revenues, and total charges and miscellaneous revenues. Rj
represents the proportion of each of the three major revenue sources in total revenues.
Calculation of revenue diversification is shown in equation (3). The value of this index
ranges from 0 to 1 with increasing values indicating greater revenue diversification.
𝑅𝐷 =

1−∑3𝑗=1 𝑅𝑗2
1−

(3)

1
3
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Non-discretionary expenditure categories may motivate government officials to
save slack, because these spending items constrain their management flexibility in coping
with unanticipated events. For example, if a city’s expenditure structure comprises
largely non-discretionary expenditure categories, government officials would be
restrained from using spending cuts to respond to revenue shortfalls. In such cases, they
may turn to alternative management options such as using accumulated financial slack to
fill in the budget gap. According to organization theory, non-discretionary expenditure
categories should be viewed as risk factors inherent in a city’s fiscal structure, and are
expected to have a positive impact on municipal financial slack accumulation. I identify
two non-discretionary expenditure categories: debt service expenditures and salary
expenditures. Debt service expenditures include principal retirement, interest and other
financial charges. Government officials have no administrative authority to change,
especially to reduce, debt service spending because the amount of this expenditure
category was pre-set at the point when the bonds were issued. I use debt service
expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures to measure this variable, and label it as
“Debt Servicei,t.” Compared to debt service expenditures, salary expenditures are a little
more discretionary. When a municipal government experiences extreme financial stress,
it can choose furloughs, pay freeze, pay cut, and a few other options as many state and
local governments did in the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Nevertheless, compared to
those discretionary expenditure categories such as parks and recreation spending, the
money saved from these salary reduction options might be limited. The furloughs are
mostly applied to non-essential workers, and the pay freeze or pay cut should not violate
the laws. The layoff procedures for public sector employers are often more complex than
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the private sector employers whose employment is purely contractual. A report shows
that in several states, the state courts upheld the right of a city to lay off personnel for
fiscal reasons.9 I hypothesize the share of salary expenditures of total expenditures may
increase a city’s financial slack accumulation. But since salary expenditures are a bit
more discretionary than debt service expenditures, I expect to see its impact on slack
accumulation is smaller compared to the impact of debt service spending. I use salaries
and wages paid to city employees as a percentage of total expenditures to measure this
variable, and label it as “Salaryi,t.”
The impact of capital expenditures on financial slack accumulation can be
explained through two relationships: the relationship between capital expenditures and
current expenditures, and the relationship between current expenditures and fund balance.
Total expenditures equal the sum of capital expenditures and current expenditures, as
expressed in equation (4). When the total expenditures level is set, there is a direct tradeoff between capital expenditures and current expenditures: an increase in capital
expenditures results in a decrease in current expenditures.
Total Expenditures = Capital Expenditures + Current Expenditures

(4)

Fund balance is the difference between total revenue and current expenditures, as
shown in equation (5). When this equation is rearranged, equation (6) demonstrates that
total revenue is the sum of current expenditures and fund balance. When the total
revenues level is held constant, there is a direct trade-off between current expenditures

Source: “Public Sector Layoffs” AELE Monthly Law Journal. June 2009.
http://www.aele.org/law/2009all06/2009-06MLJ201.pdf (accessed on April 8, 2016).
9
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and fund balance: a decrease in current expenditures leads to an increase in the UFB (i.e.
the unreserved proportion of fund balance).
Fund Balance = Total Revenues - Current Expenditures

(5)

Total Revenues = Current Expenditures + Fund Balance

(6)

Under the balanced budget requirement where total expenditures equal total
revenues, the right hand side of equation (4) equals the right hand side of equation (6).
The current expenditures thus links the relationship between capital expenditures and
financial slack. When total expenditures and total revenues are held constant, an increase
in capital expenditures results in a decrease in current expenditures (expressed in
equation (4)); a decrease in current expenditures leads to an increase in UFB (expressed
in equation (6)). Based on the above analysis, I expect a positive impact of capital
expenditures on financial slack accumulation. I use capital expenditures as a percentage
of total expenditures to measure this variable, and label it as “Capitali,t.”
Prior studies have found that smaller cities tend to maintain higher level of
financial slack (Hendrick 2006; Marlowe 2012). Figures 3 and 4 of this chapter also show
the negative relationship between city size and financial slack level. One possible
explanation is larger organizations have more connections that allow managers to have
more options and opportunities in their management when circumstances change
(Thompson 1967). For example, larger governments often involve greater volume of
activities that government officials can make trade-offs among one another. Also, smaller
cities may face more restrictions in raising money through the issuance of debt. I include
the natural logarithm of population to control the impact of city size in the model.
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The overall economic condition may affect a city’s finance and its financial slack
accumulation. Researchers often use unemployment rate as an indicator of economic
condition. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) does not report unemployment rates for
individual municipality. At the local level, it reports unemployment rates for counties,
and cities of 25,000 populations or more, and for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).
In my sample, about 45 percent of the cities have less than 25,000 populations. And the
complicated overlaps of jurisdictional boundaries among MSAs, counties, and cities
make it extremely challenging to identify unemployment rate for individual cities.
Therefore, I choose the state level unemployment rate in the model, and expect to see that
as unemployment rates rise, municipal financial slack would decrease. Table 3 reports a
summary of descriptive statistics of variables.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Dependent Variable
Slack

20.968

47.689

-19.350

3064.748

Independent Variables
Volatility
IG Revenue
Revenue Diversification
Debt Service
Salary
Capital

5.885
16.235
0.857
4.736
29.175
18.689

4.736
11.932
0.116
4.262
10.759
11.549

0
0
0.078
0
0
0

41.806
90.051
1.000
77.732
75.580
83.495

Control Variable
Log of Population
Unemployment Rate

10.316
6.794

1.146
2.381

3.497
2.6

15.943
13.8

Number of Observations: 15,958
Number of Cities: 2,160
Average Time Span: 7.4 years
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2.4.2 Model Specification
Based on the previous discussion, the model of municipal financial slack
accumulation can be expressed:
𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐺 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡

(7)

Where 𝜃𝑖 are city fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the
idiosyncratic error term not correlated with the explanatory variables of all past, current,
and future time periods of the same city. One immediate problem in applying the fixed
effects to this empirical problem is that the dependent variable 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 by nature is
strongly persistent (Wooldridge 2012, 391-395). As demonstrated in equation (8), the
current year unreserved general fund balance is equal to the amount of fund balance
accumulated in prior years plus any surplus or deficit in the current year; thus 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1
is highly correlated with the fixed effects in the error term, which gives rise to ‘dynamic
panel bias’ problem (Nickell 1981).
𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡

(8)

Some researchers address this dependent variable persistence problem by
including a lagged dependent variable as an instrumental variable on the right-hand side
of the equation. However, this causes a new problem. It inflates the coefficient estimate
for the lagged dependent variable significantly by attributing predictive power to it that
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actually belongs to the city’s fixed effects. If the time range were large (large T), the
impact of one year’s shock on the city’s fixed effect would dwindle. In this study, the
panel consists of only nine years but many cross-sections, that is, ‘small T, large N.’
Using the above technique on panel data with such a structure inevitably results in sizable
estimate bias. An additional issue with this model is that some of the independent
variables may not be strictly exogenous; that is, independent of current disturbances, they
are correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error term 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 , meaning
that these independent variables may be determined simultaneously with municipal
financial slack accumulation.
The generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimators are increasingly popular
to address the above problems in dynamic panel data analysis. This method was first
proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), and later developed by Arellano
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Roodman
(2009) introduces how to implement GMM analysis in Stata. The GMM estimators are
designed for situations with 1) ‘small T, large N’ panels; 2) a linear functional
relationship; 3) dynamic dependent variable; 3) independent variables that are not strictly
exogenous; 5) fixed effects; and 6) heteroskedasticity and auto correlation within
individuals but not across them. This method removes the individual fixed effects as well
as any associated omitted variable bias by differencing the equation. To overcome the
correlation between the regressors (including the lagged dependent variable), the GMM
estimation uses lags of all endogenous variables as instrumental variables. Thus the
GMM estimators do not require good instruments. They assume the lags are good internal
instruments; nevertheless they do allow the inclusion of external instruments (Roodman
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2009). This assumption is especially valuable when potential instruments are difficult or
impossible to determine. In this case, I treat all independent variables as endogenous
variables except state unemployment rate, log of population, and year dummies. I lag
them by two years because the standard treatment in the GMM is lags 2 or longer if
variables are endogenous.
Two GMM estimations are commonly used. One is the difference GMM, and the
other is the system GMM. The difference GMM tends to magnify gaps in unbalanced
panels, causing large data loss. The system GMM developed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) preserves sample size in panels with gaps: instead of subtracting the previous
observation from the contemporaneous one, it subtracts the average of all future available
observations of a variable (Roodman 2009). Since the panel structure in this study is
unbalanced, I use the system GMM for estimation based on the orthogonal deviations.
The model includes year dummies to prevent the most likely form of cross-individual
correlations—the contemporaneous correlations. This model reports robust standard
errors adjusted by the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction without which those
standard errors tend to be severely downward biased.
2.5 Results
Table 4 reports the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimators and some essential
statistical tests results. The F-test assesses the overall significance of the model. The Fstatistics of 14.43, significant at the .000 level suggests the overall fit is highly
significant. The Arellano-Bond tests examine autocorrelation in the panel. As expected,
the AR (1) z-score of -2.26 is significant at the .05 level, presenting strong evidence that
there is first-order serial autocorrelation. The AR (2) z-score of 1.40 is not statistically
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significant, suggesting there is no second-order serial correlation in the panel. These
results confirm that the moment condition assumed by the system GMM is valid, and the
second-order serial correlation does not bias the standard errors. The Hansen test checks
for joint validity of the instruments. Significant Hansen J statistics indicates the model is
mis-specified.10 In this case, the Hansen J statistics is insignificant, suggesting the
instruments set in the model is appropriate.

Table 4. Estimates of Municipal Financial Slack Accumulation, 2003-2011

Slackt-1
Volatility
IG Revenue
Revenue Diversification
Debt Service
Salary
Capital
Log of Population
Unemployment Rate

Coefficient

Robust Std. Err.

t Statistics

0.148***
5.279**
0.276*
4.787
0.987**
0.248*
0.563***
-8.423***
1.418

0.035
2.317
0.166
23.289
0.466
0.136
0.102
1.457
1.249

4.19
2.28
1.66
0.21
2.12
1.82
5.52
-5.78
1.13

(Results on year dummies omitted)
Number of observations: 5,468
Number of groups: 1,199
Number of instruments: 250
F(26,1198) = 14.43***
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.26**
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 1.40
Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions: chi2(223) = 247.86
Note: * significant at 0.10 level

** significant at 0.05 level

10

*** significant at 0.01 level

Source: StataCorp. 2013. Stata 13 base reference manual.
http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rgmmpostestimation.pdf (accessed on March 7, 2016).

52

The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimators provide useful information to
understand factors that contribute to municipal financial slack accumulation. The
regression coefficient on one-year lag of financial slack is highly significant but relative
small in size. Recall equation (8) to interpret this coefficient: the end-of-year financial
slack equals the beginning-of-year financial slack plus any surplus or deficits that occur
during the current year. The one-year-lag of financial slack is actually the beginning-ofyear slack, which represents the amount of financial slack accumulated in prior years.
The surplus or deficits that occur during the current year are the change of financial slack.
The coefficient of .148 is thus interpreted in the following way: holding all other
variables constant, if financial slack increases by 10 percentage points during the year,
the end-of-year financial slack will increase by 1.48 percentage points. This means that
municipal governments only keep less than 15 percent of the newly generated surplus in
unreserved general fund balance. The majority of the surplus are either reserved for
specific purposes (e.g. debt service spending, capital improvements, etc.) in future years
or spent in the current year. This finding goes against the public choice’s argument that
governments by nature are slack-maximizing bureaucracies (Niskanen 1971; Brennan
and Buchanan 1980; Oates 1985).
As expected, volatile tax revenues as a risk factor imposes a positive impact on a
city’s financial slack level. Holding other variables constant, 1 percentage point increase
of tax revenue volatility raises a city’s financial slack level by 5.3 percentage points. This
finding is consistent with what Gore (2009) finds using a different revenue volatility
measure (i.e. coefficient of variation) and a different financial slack measure (i.e. the endof-year cash and market securities). In Gore (2009)’s study, the coefficient of variation is
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the ratio of standard deviation of total revenues divided by the total average revenues
over the prior four years. She reveals a significant positive impact of revenue volatility on
a city’s cash holdings. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond coefficient on tax revenue
volatility in this study together with Gore’s finding confirm the hypothesis that cities with
more volatile tax revenues tend to accumulate more financial slack.
The coefficient on IG Revenue is positive, suggesting a possible relationship that
dependence on intergovernmental revenues, as a risk factor in a city’s revenue structure,
may lead to increased financial slack accumulation. This coefficient is at the .10 level. In
Hendrick (2006)’s study, she uses pooled OLS regression and finds that dependence on
intergovernmental revenues reduces a city’s financial slack. Hendrick’s finding
contradicts her hypothesis that the share of intergovernmental revenues and financial
slack level should have a positive relationship. She explains that it is possible that
municipalities do not recognize dependence on intergovernmental revenues as a risky
condition. Her estimates based on pooled OLS might be biased. As discussed in section
2.4.2 “Model Specification”, using OLS regression to analyze a dataset with a dynamic
panel structure will produce bias estimates. How intergovernmental revenues affect a
city’s savings needs further exploration. The other revenue factor—Revenue
Diversification—which is often considered as a risk-averse management strategy, does
not show any significant impact in the model. This factor also needs further
investigations in future studies.
Non-discretionary expenditure categories are considered as risk factors in a city’s
expenditure structure. According to the risk-slack hypothesis, they are expected to
impose positive influence on municipal financial slack accumulation. The statistically
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significant and positive coefficients on the two non-discretionary expenditure
categories—Debt Service and Salary—confirm the hypothesis. As expected, since debt
service expenditures were pre-set which offers government officials little room to
implement spending discretion, government officials tend to accumulate more financial
slack if their municipal governments have heavier debt service spending burden. Holding
other variables constant, 10 percentage points increase in the share of debt service
expenditures raises financial slack accumulation by 9.9 percentage points. Salary
expenditures though considered as a non-discretionary expenditure category, still allows
government officials some management flexibility. When a government experiences
extreme fiscal stress, government officials can exercise their discretion to change the
amount of expenditures on salaries and benefits in response to severe financial challenges
through ways such as furloughs, lay-offs, pay cut, pay freeze, benefit changes, and other
methods. Because salary expenditures’ non-discretion feature is not as strong as debt
service expenditures, the coefficient on Salary is smaller. A 10-percentage-points
increase in the share of salary expenditures raises financial slack by 2.5 percentage
points.
The coefficient on Capital indicates a positive relationship between capital
expenditures and municipal financial slack accumulation, consistent with my hypothesis.
Holding other variables constant, a 10-percentage-points increase in capital expenditures
is associated with a 5.6-percentage-points increase in financial slack accumulation. The
impact of capital expenditures on financial slack accumulation is linked through current
expenditures. The relationships of the three variables are expressed in equations (4), (5),
and (6) in section 2.4.2.
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The last variable in the model that demonstrates a significant impact on municipal
financial slack accumulation is city size measured by log of total population. Consistent
with my hypothesis and findings in prior studies (Hendrick 2006; Gore 2009), larger
cities accumulate less financial slack. The coefficient on log of population shows that all
else equal, as total population increases by 10 percent, UFB as a percent of total current
expenditures decreases by 8.4 percent.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter of the dissertation addresses an important question in municipal
finance: what factors affect municipal financial slack accumulation? Built on
organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis, this chapter examines whether tax revenue
volatility leads to an increase in financial slack accumulation. To test this hypothesis, I
create a combined dataset that include municipal financial slack information and details
in municipal revenues, expenditures, and debt positions. This dataset provides an avenue
to study how factors, especially those risk factors inherent in a city’s fiscal structure,
affect its financial slack level. This dataset includes cities in fifty states over a period of
time before and after the Great Recession. Findings from this study have greater external
validity than studies that use samples of cities in one state or one metropolitan area. The
use of proper method—the system GMM for small T, large N dynamic panel—also
guarantees that findings from this study are reliable and robust.
The findings that tax revenue volatility and other risk factors in a city’s fiscal
structure such as dependence on intergovernmental revenues and non-discretionary
expenditure categories increase municipal financial slack accumulation support
organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis that organizations with more risk factors need
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more financial slack to hedge against them. The finding that municipal governments only
keep 15 percent of newly generated surplus as financial slack provides evidence against
public choice scholars’ argument that governments are slack-maximizing bureaucracies.
These findings suggest that municipal financial slack accumulation is not primarily
driven by governments’ slack-maximizing nature, but rather more of a precautionary
financial management strategy to react to the risk factors inherent in their fiscal
structures.
This chapter provides a basis for further assessing why governments accumulate
financial slack. Yet there is still a tremendous gap in the understanding of local
government slack accumulation, regarding the rationales, the motivation, the optimal
level, and the impacts (both intentional and unanticipated). Such research is necessary if
our current understanding on appropriate level of financial slack needs to move beyond
the simple rules, such as the conventional ‘five-percent’ rule or the GFOA recommended
benchmarks on local financial slack accumulation.
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CHAPTER 3
FINANCIAL SLACK AND MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURE STABILIZATION

3.1 Introduction
In the United States, municipal governments are on the frontline to provide vital
public goods and services that affect people’s daily life, from police and fire to sanitation,
road maintenance, public recreation facilities, and community centers for the elders. They
also provide the necessary infrastructure, safe environment, and civilized work force
upon which business flourishes. Financial resources are the lifeblood of these public
goods and services. The availability and stability of public expenditures directly shape
many of the outcomes that matter to citizens and local economy.
Municipal governments generally decide how much they spend based on the
amount of revenues they expect to collect. Thus stable and predictable revenues help
achieve the expenditure stabilization goal. The property tax has the feature of relatively
stable yield and resistance to the business cycles. Mikesell and Liu (2013) find that
during the Great Recession of 2007-2009, property tax collections remained surprisingly
stable while collections from other major local taxes declined significantly. Despite the
property tax’s stable yield nature, American cities have gradually changed their
dependence on property tax to more volatile revenue sources such as income and sales
taxes over the past hundred years. This change in municipal tax structure causes greater
revenue volatility which further leads to increasing expenditure fluctuations. The
business cycles intensify revenue and expenditure volatility. Without any counter-cyclical
fiscal policy, expenditures drop dramatically in economic downturns due to revenue
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shortfalls and grow excessively in economic upturns due to revenue prosperity. Frequent
expenditure changes inevitably affect the sustainability and quality of public service
provisions. Spending cuts during economic downturns (often called cutback or pullback
policies) may cause disruption or termination of some public services (Bourdeaux and
Hildreth 2012). This hurts those (primarily socially disadvantaged groups) who have
greater dependence on public goods and services as they have less money available to
pay for alternative options. The pro-cyclical expenditure fluctuations also create a socalled ‘negative feedback loop’: spending increase and tax cuts during economic
expansion add force to the booms; whereas spending cuts and tax increase during
economic recession deepen cyclical busts (Poterba 1995; Levinson 1998; Thompson and
Gates 2007; Plerhoples and Scorsone 2012). To sum up, unstable municipal expenditures
affect not only the continuity of local public service provisions but also the health of local
economy. Therefore, municipal governments need strategic fiscal policies or financial
management tools to stabilize expenditures.
In the management literature, instability or volatility is analogous to risk.
Organization theorists argue that financial slack serves as a cushion protecting
organizations from internal and external shocks (Cyert and March 1963; Levinthal and
March 1981; Moe 1984). I test this proposition in Chapter Two and find that municipal
governments with greater tax revenue volatility and other risk factors inherent in the
fiscal system accumulate more financial slack. This finding indicates that municipal
government officials may accumulate financial slack to buffer against risks. Do they use
the accumulated financial slack to stabilize expenditures? This chapter examines the role
of financial slack on municipal expenditures stabilization. The discussion proceeds in five
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sections: following the introduction section, section two explains the role of financial
slack in balancing the budget and stabilizing expenditures in municipal finance, as well as
empirical findings of financial slack’s expenditure stabilization effects in subnational
government. Section three develops a theoretical model and discusses the appropriate
methods for the analysis. Section four introduces data sources, describes the national
sample, and interprets the regression results. The final section implies findings of this
study for the theories and practices of municipal fiscal administration.
3.2 Financial Slack as an Expenditure Stabilization Tool
The study of municipal expenditure stabilization is rooted in the theoretical
development of subnational government counter-cyclical fiscal policies. In the mid1930s, Keynes published The Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money where he
posited that central government could implement counter-cyclical fiscal policies to
stabilize the economy over the business cycles—government uses large-scale deficit
spending in economic downturns to pull up aggregated demand to stimulate the sluggish
economy. Musgrave (1959) later theorized the above government role posited by Keynes
as one of the three basic government functions—the economic stabilization function
(Oates 1972). The standard Musgrave theory assumes the stabilization function of
government is exclusively a role of the central government. This view was challenged by
Gramlich (1987) who argued that subnational governments also play a stabilization role
to counteract the business cycles. Given that subnational governments have limited fiscal
capacity and are constrained by fiscal and budgetary rules, subnational governments’
stabilization role often refers to budget or expenditure stabilization rather than economic
stabilization (Wang and Hou 2012). The expenditure stabilization role of local
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governments is no less important than the economic stabilization role. Stable
expenditures are the foundation of municipal service provisions. Stable expenditures also
mitigate the effect of ‘negative feedback loop’ which hurts the local economy.
As the understanding of subnational governments’ expenditure stabilization role
evolved, subnational governments realized the value of financial slack as an expenditure
stabilization tool. Financial slack accumulation counteracts revenue ups and downs: it
absorbs extra revenues during the boom years and provides money to offset revenue
shortfalls in the lean years. It is a form of self-insurance on expenditures against revenue
volatility. Some governments establish formal saving device, such as budget stabilization
funds, rainy day funds, or other types of reserve funds. So far, almost all state
governments have established at least one of such funds (Thatcher 2008). Local
governments rarely establish a formal or separate budget stabilization fund. Some local
governments are even prohibited by their state governments from having such a fund
(Hou 2008). Instead, local governments often rely on an informal saving device—the
general fund balance—to accumulate financial slack (Wolkoff 1987; Marlowe 2005).
Researchers have produced a rich literature on state government expenditure
stabilization, including the creation, use, and impacts of the rainy funds, the budget
stabilization funds, reserve funds, the general fund balance, and other stabilization tools.
Hou (2003) studied the expenditure stabilization effects of the budget stabilization funds
(BSFs) and the general fund unreserved undesignated fund balances (UUBs) in state
governments. He found that BSFs exert significant counter-cyclical stabilization effects
on state expenditures—they bolster state spending levels during economic downturn
years. UUBs, however, do not show observable stabilization effects. Hou concluded that
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the BSFs’ role in expenditure stabilization overshadowed the UUBs’ role since state
governments increasingly rely on formal counter-cyclical fiscal tools—the BSFs—to
balance their budgets as well as to smooth expenditures. Along with Hou’s study, a series
of studies were conducted to examine the expenditure stabilization effects of formal and
informal savings in state governments (Pollock and Suyderhoud 1986; Gramlich 1987;
Navin and Navin 1997; Joyce 2001; Hou 2003, 2005; Wagner 2003; Wagner and Elder
2005, 2007). These studies have reached relatively consistent conclusions that state
savings (i.e. financial slack) serve as stabilization device that smooth expenditures over
the business cycles, although the stabilization effect can be limited in some cases.
Studies on local expenditure stabilization are scarce, and findings from these
studies are not conclusive. Marlowe (2005) first examined financial slack’s countercyclical expenditure stabilization effect at the local level. Using a sample of 103
Minnesota cities from 1990 to 2000, he analyzed the effects of three types of financial
slack—unreserved general fund balance, designated general fund balance, and reserved
general fund balance. He found that unreserved general fund balance has a marginal
nevertheless important counter-cyclical stabilization effect as it boosts expenditures
during downturn years; designated general fund balance has a pro-cyclical effects; and
reserved general fund balance has a “siphoning” effect as it decreases positive
expenditure gaps during economic boom years.
Hendrick (2006) used a sample of 264 cities in the Chicago metropolitan area
from 1997 to 2003 to study the determinants of unreserved general fund balance and its
impacts on municipal governments’ fiscal conditions. She found a significant and
positive relationship between unreserved general fund balance and municipal
66

expenditures, although the findings only showed significance in the full model, not for
individual years. Even if the findings were significant for each year, a mere positive
relationship between the two variables is not direct evidence that unreserved general fund
balance smooths expenditure fluctuations.
Wang and Hou (2012) examined the impact of fund balance on expenditure
stabilization using a sample of 100 North Carolina counties for the period of 1990 and
2007. They did not find evidence that fund balance exerts a counter-cyclical stabilization
effect on local expenditures. Wang (2015) later extended the time span of the same
dataset to 2011. Based on the updated dataset, he re-examined fund balance’s expenditure
stabilization roles in the Great Recession and earlier recessions. He found that fund
balance played a counter-cyclical stabilization role in 2005-2011, but not in 1994-2004.
The above literature review reveals some common issues in prior studies on local
expenditure stabilization. First, whether financial slack plays an expenditure stabilization
role in local government finance remains an open question, as these studies show mixed
findings. Second, external validity can be an issue since all of these studies use samples
of cities in one state or a particular metropolitan area. For example, North Carolina has a
conservative fiscal administration system and the state government exerts strong control
overall the fiscal practices of its local governments, whereas Illinois state government
gives its local governments more discretionary fiscal authority. Results from North
Carolina counties should not be simply generalized to cities in the Chicago metropolitan
area. Third, the time spans of these studies mostly cover periods from post-1990s to preGreat Recession. As Wang (2015)’s study suggests, the choice of time span may affect
estimations.
67

In this chapter of the dissertation, I use a dataset that consists of a sample of cities
nationwide from 2003 to 2011 to study the roles of financial slack in municipal
expenditure stabilization. Different from prior studies that focus on the effect of financial
slack on local counter-cyclical stabilization through the business cycles, this study shifts
the focus from a macro perspective of expenditure fluctuations in the economic booms
and busts to a relatively micro perspective of the year-to-year expenditure adjustments:
how does a municipal government adjust its expenditures to respond to a revenue change
within a fiscal year? And what roles does financial slack play during this expenditure
adjustment process? By focusing on the role of financial slack in the annual expenditure
changes, this study dissects the mechanism of financial slack’s expenditure stabilization
effects. Further, this study also provides an opportunity to observe municipal government
officials’ management decisions when circumstances change.
3.3 Methodology and Model Specification
Municipal governments generally make their expenditure decisions based on the
amount of revenues they expect to collect. Under the balanced budget requirements
which apply to most state and local governments,11 estimated expenditures should not
exceed estimated revenues in the budget. As discussed in Chapter One, many
governments begin their budget preparations several months before the start of a new
fiscal year. During the long time between budget preparation and budget implementation,
estimation errors are inevitable due to the complexity of economic and social activities so
that the actual revenues rarely equal the estimated revenues. If actual revenues deviate

Source: “Achieving a Structurally Balanced Budget” The Government Finance Officers Association.
Updated February 2012. http://www.gfoa.org/achieving-structurally-balanced-budget (Accessed on March
17, 2016).
11
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from budget estimates, municipal government officials have to adjust expenditures in
order to keep their budgets balanced. Without any expenditure stabilization tool, the
expenditure adjustment should equal to the revenue change; that is to say, if revenues
drop (increase) by ten percent, spending has to be cut (raised) by ten percent. Figure 7
presents a picture of the annual changes of total revenues and expenditures in the general
fund of 2,160 U.S. cities between fiscal years 2003 and 2011. Each data point represents
the difference of current year general fund revenues or expenditures of these cities
compared to their previous year values divided by previous year total general fund
revenues. The figure shows that except during the Great Recession when the general fund
revenues and expenditures declined to the same extent, the overall expenditure
fluctuation is a little smoother than the overall revenue changes, suggesting that these
cities might have used some fiscal policies or financial management strategies to stabilize
their expenditures.
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Figure 7. Overall Total General Fund Expenditure and Revenue Fluctuations (2003-2011)

State governments generally establish a separate budget stabilization fund or rainy
day fund to manage expenditure fluctuations. Unlike state governments, municipal
governments more often use the general fund balance, especially the unreserved general
fund balance (UFB), as an expenditure stabilization tool. Although scholars have found
mixed results regarding UFB’s expenditure stabilization effect in local governments,
some do find that UFB plays a significant role in stabilizing local expenditures over the
course of business cycles (Marlowe 2005; Wang 2015). As a financial management tool,
UFB absorbs additional revenues when there is a budget surplus, avoiding expenditure
expansion caused by excessive revenue growth during the boom years; when there is a
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revenue shortfall, UFB fills in the budget gap, diminishing a dramatic spending cut
during the lean years. UFB also works as a form of self-insurance against unanticipated
events. For example, there might be a natural disaster or a crime wave that calls for a
spending spike. When encountering such an event, local government officials could use
cash or convert fungible resources such as market securities and receivables stored in the
UFB into cash to provide additional financial resources to respond to these emergencies
promptly and effectively. In the following part of this section, I specify a model that
examines how the UFB serves as an expenditure stabilization tool when municipal
governments need to adjustment expenditures in response to revenue changes.
3.3.1 Methodology
A city’s expenditures are primarily determined by its revenues, and also affected
by the unreserved general fund balance. Equation (9) expresses this relationship:
𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑈𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡

(9)

where 𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the total general fund expenditures for city i in year t; 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the total
general fund revenues for city i in year t; 𝑈𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of unreserved general
fund balance for city i in year t; 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents a group of observable and measurable
control variables that affect a city’s expenditures; 𝑎𝑖 represents the unobserved timeinvariant factors (at least constant within the time span of the study period) that affect a
city’s expenditures, such as a city’s economic base, industrial mix, form of government,
political conservatism, the presence of certain fiscal rules and policies (e.g. balanced
budget policy, fund balance policy, debt limit policy, etc.), and so on. The 𝑎𝑖 is
commonly called a “fixed effect” (Wooldridge 2012, 460). The error 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is called the
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idiosyncractic error, referring to those unobserved time-variant factors that affect a city’s
expenditures.
Differencing all the variables in equation (9) over time gets the following
equation:
∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑈𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡

(10)

where ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes the change of total general fund expenditures of city i from year t-1
to year t; ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes the change of total general fund revenues of city i from year t-1
to year t; ∆𝑈𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 denotes the change of total unreserved general fund balance of city i
from year t-1 to year t; and ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 denotes changes of each observable and measurable
control variables in the model from year t-1 to year t. The unobserved time-invariant
individual fixed effect 𝑎𝑖 is differenced away. Equation (10) is called the first-differenced
equation, and the OLS estimators of βs in this equation are called the first-differenced
estimators (Wooldridge 2012, 461). The first-differenced equation model not only
controls for omitted time-invariant variables as the fixed effects model does, but also
addresses the serial correlation problems. The government revenue and expenditure time
series by nature are highly persistent (or strongly dependent), meaning that the value of
current year expenditures or revenues is highly correlated with the previous year’s value.
This is a reasonable concern considering that incrementalism is a traditional and common
budget making approach among local governments. In addition, the variable UFB is also
of high persistence because the current year UFB reflects the sum of UFB accumulated in
all prior years and the newly generated UFB from the current year. The first-differenced
equation model addresses serial correlation by subtracting the value of previous
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observation from the value of current observation. After the differencing process, the
first-differenced series is considered an independent and identically distributed sequence.
In addition to addressing the problems of omitted time-invariant variable bias and serial
correlation, differencing time series also removes any linear time trend in the dependent
and explanatory variables which may bias the regression estimates (Wooldridge 2012,
395-96). To further control the time serial effect and to capture the secular trend, I add
year dummies in the model.
The first-differenced equation model has another advantage for this study—it
explicitly examines how changes in the explanatory variables affect the changes in the
dependent variable over the same time period. This serves well to investigate the
proposed research questions in this chapter: how do municipal governments adjust
expenditures when facing a revenue change and how does the change in financial slack
help stabilize municipal expenditures during this process?
3.3.2 Model Specification
Based on equation (10), I develop a first-differenced equation model that tests the
above research questions. The model is expressed as:
∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2 ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5 ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡 ′ 𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼7 ∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
(12)
where ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 , ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 , ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 are changes in individual municipal government’s total
general fund expenditures, total general fund revenues, and unreserved general fund
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balances from year t-1 to year t, respectively. These changes are then divided by each
city’s previous year total revenues to address heteroscedasticity or in other words, to
make them more comparable. ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 denote the change of debt
service expenditures as a proportion of total expenditures and the change of salary and
wages paid to city public employees as a proportion of total expenditures from year t-1 to
year t, respectively. ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡′𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denote the change
of property tax revenues as a share of total revenues and the change of intergovernmental
revenues as a share of total revenues from year t-1 to year t, respectively.
∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡 represents a city’s population growth, which is measured as the change
of total population of city i from year t-1 to year t divided by this city’s previous year
population. 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚,𝑡 denotes the unemployment rate for state m in year
t. As introduced in Chapter Two, due to the fact that the Bureau of Labor Statistics does
not report unemployment rates for individual municipalities, and the complexity of
jurisdictional boundaries among MSAs, counties, and cities, it is very challenging to
identify unemployment rate for individual cities based on currently available information.
Therefore, I use the state level unemployment rate to control for the overall economic
condition. Lastly, I include year dummies denoted as 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 in the model to control for
temporal variation in the dependent variable.
The primary variables of interest are ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 . Based on municipal
governments’ budget making process and financial management practice, changes in
revenues (∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) should be the primary driver of expenditure changes. I expect 𝛼1 to
have a positive sign with a value between 0 (where there is no expenditure adjustment)
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and 1 (where expenditures adjust as much as the revenue change, indicating that the
expected stabilization tool—UFB—does not have any impact on expenditure changes).
I expect changes in UFB (∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ) is an important player in the expenditure
adjustment process, although its effect may not be as strong as changes in revenues. If
UFB plays an expenditure stabilization role in this adjustment process, ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 should
counteract expenditure changes (∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ): an increase in ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 indicates that it absorbs
revenue surplus, and this holds back expenditure growth, leading to a decrease in ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 .
A decrease in ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 means it releases financial slack to support expenditures, and this
boosts up expenditure growth, leading to an increase in ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 . The coefficient 𝛼2 thus
measures UFB’s effect on municipal expenditure adjustments. A negative sign of 𝛼2
indicates that UFB has an expenditure stabilization effect. Indirectly, 𝛼2 also suggests the
tradeoff government officials have made between spending and saving. If a municipal
government experiences a revenue increase in the current year, the change in revenues
(∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) indicates a revenue surplus. Municipal government officials can decide to spend
the surplus in the current year or to save it for future use either in the form of financial
slack or as reserves for specific purposes. The coefficient 𝛼2 thus indicates the proportion
of the current year surplus kept as savings. A large size of 𝛼2 provides evidence that
governments are slack-maximizing bureaucracies.
Municipal government officials may feel different pressures when they face a
revenue surplus or a revenue shortfall. When a city experiences a revenue increase, city
officials need to decide whether to spend the revenue surplus in the current year or to
keep it as savings for the future. If they decide to spend it, they may face the challenge of
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allocating the extra money fairly among various programs and interest groups. When a
city experiences a revenue decline, city officials have to cope with the budget deficit by
either increasing taxes or cutting expenditures. To fill in a budget gap is often more
challenging than to allocate extra money because raising taxes is very likely to receive
opposition from tax payers and cutting expenditures is likely to interrupt public service
provision which may cause citizen dissatisfaction. It is politically costly for local elected
officials. Therefore, city officials may invest greater effort in keeping expenditures stable
during a revenue shortfall. I hypothesize that the UFB plays a more important role in
stabilizing municipal expenditures when a city’s revenues decline. To capture this
possible nuance of the UFB’s expenditure stabilization effects in different situations, I
separate the regressions in scenarios of revenue increase and decrease.
Spending flexibility determines to what extent government officials can adjust
expenditures to cope with revenue changes. Less discretionary expenditure categories
offer government officials very little room to do so. I identify two less discretionary
expenditure categories: the share of debt service expenditures in total expenditures and
the share of salary expenditures in total expenditures. Debt service expenditures include
principal retirement, interest and other financial charges. The amount of debt service
expenditures was set at the time when the bonds were issued. Government officials have
no administrative authority to change or reduce debt service expenditures even if in face
of fiscal stress. If a city’s debt service expenditure burden increases, government
officials’ management discretion in adjusting expenditures to cope with revenue changes
would decrease. I expect the sign of ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is negative, and the effect of this
variable is greater in the scenario of a revenue shortfall.
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Salaries and wages paid to city employees are another less discretionary
expenditure category. Though government officials can choose furloughs, pay freeze, pay
cut, and other options when their cities experience extreme fiscal stress as many state and
local governments did in the Great Recession of 2007-2009, it is probably not wise to use
these salary control strategies as a regular response to revenue changes, especially small
revenue changes. After all, recruiting new workers and job training are time consuming
and administratively costly. I hypothesize the salary expenditure category has the same
effect on municipal expenditure adjustments as the debt service expenditures do. Because
salary expenditures are a little more discretionary than debt service expenditures, I expect
the effect of salary expenditures on municipal expenditure stabilization to be smaller than
the effect of debt service expenditures.
The volatility of a city’s revenues directly affects its need for expenditure
adjustments. I identify two major revenue sources that may affect municipal
governments’ revenue volatility: property tax revenues and intergovernmental revenues.
The property tax has low elasticity compared to other taxes (Wilford 1965; Felix 2008).
If not constrained by certain tax limits, local government officials may be able adjust the
millage rates in the opposite direction to offset changes in property values. Also, the
property values are not assessed every year. Thus the changes in market property values
are not immediately reflected in property tax collections (Mikesell and Liu 2013). The
combination of millage rates adjustments together with the property value assessment
lags makes property tax a stable local revenue source. This feature of property tax has
proven to be an important advantage in economic recessions, which explains why local
governments’ revenue collections held up better than state governments in the Great
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Recession (Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist 2011; Alm 2013; Mikesell and Liu 2013). I
hypothesize that cities with greater dependence on the property tax have lower overall
revenue volatility and are thus in lower needs of expenditure adjustments. I expect the
sign of ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 to be negative.
In contrast, the dependence on intergovernmental revenues may add uncertainty
in municipal revenue estimation because the amount of aid and the time for
disbursements are not subject to municipal governments’ complete control. The delay of
aid disbursement may create cash flow problems which increases the need of expenditure
adjustments. To make things worse, state governments sometimes reduce the amount of
aid or delay the disbursement during economic recessions due to their own fiscal stress
(Reschovsky 2004; Hoene 2009).This forces municipal governments to make further
expenditure adjustments. I hypothesize that cities with a greater share of
intergovernmental revenues have more expenditure adjustments. The sign of
∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡′𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is thus expected to be positive.
Municipal expenditures are driven by local residents’ demands in public goods
and services. A city with a growing population is more likely to increase expenditures on
police, fire, public infrastructure, and so on. I include population growth
(∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡 ) in the model and expect this variable to have a positive sign.
Municipal governments’ own-source revenues are generated from the local economic
base, and are thus affected by the overall economic condition. I use state unemployment
rates to measure the overall economic conditions. Greater unemployment rates indicate a
declining economy in which government expenditure growth tends to slow down.
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Therefore, I hypothesize a higher unemployment rate (𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚,𝑡 ) is
associated with lower municipal expenditure growth (∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ).
3.4 Sample Descriptions and Results
This study is based on the same data set—the combined Census and GFOA panel
data—used in Chapter Two. Details of data cleaning are described in section 2.3 in
Chapter Two. The sample includes 15,958 observations for 2,160 individual cities of fifty
states between fiscal years 2003 and 2011. Table 5 Panel A presents descriptive
information about the cities in the sample. All the financial variables have been inflationadjusted based on the Consumer Price Index of all urban consumers published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of variables included
in the regressions. The average change in total general fund revenues (ΔTR) is 7.4
percent with a standard deviation of 14.6 percent, suggesting that changes in total general
fund revenues are relatively moderate for most of the cities from 2003 to 2011. The
average change in total general fund expenditures (ΔTE) is 6.8 percent with a standard
deviation of 14.7 percent. The smaller average change in general fund expenditures with
a similar standard deviation indicates that on average general fund expenditures are less
volatile than general fund revenues during the study period.
Table 6 reports the first-differenced estimators from pooled OLS regressions. In
cross-section time series data set, observations within each municipality may be
correlated in some unknown way, inducing correlation in 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 within i. This error is often
referred as the clustered errors. In the presence of clustered errors, OLS estimates are still
unbiased but standard errors may be underestimated, leading to incorrect inference. To
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address this issue, I use the Huber-White standard errors clustered by individual
municipality which allow for intragroup correlation (Froot 1989). Numbers in
parentheses in Table 6 are Huber-White standard errors.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Panel A: Characteristics of Sample Cities

Total General Fund Expenditures (’000)
Total General Fund Revenues (’000)
Total UFB (’000)
Debt Service Exps./Total Exps.
Salary Exps./Total Exps.
Property Tax Rev./Total Rev.
Intergovt'l Rev./Total Rev.
Population

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

94,400
99,000
14,500
0.047
0.292
0.203
0.162
69,970

1,430,000
1,530,000
32,600
0.043
0.108
0.135
0.119
258,823

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

0.068
0.074
0.033
-0.001
-0.004
0.003
-0.003
0.020
6.794

0.147
0.146
0.174
0.023
0.068
0.037
0.053
0.276
2.382

-2.035
-0.953
-3.338
-0.236
-0.469
-0.385
-0.619
-0.912
2.6

4.469
4.797
6.528
0.508
0.490
0.382
0.594
12.883
13.8

0.401 73,100,000
389.942 79,200,000
-320,000
922,000
0
0.777
0
0.756
0
0.776
0
0.901
33 8,391,881

Panel B: Regression Variables

ΔTE
ΔTR
ΔUFB
ΔDebt Service
ΔSalary
ΔProperty Tax
ΔIntergovt'l Revenue
ΔPopulation
Unemployment Rate
Number of Observations: 15,958
Number of Cities: 2,160
Average Time Span: 7.4 years
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Table 6. Regression Results from the First-Differenced Equation Model
Revenues Increase

ΔTR
ΔUFB
ΔDebt Service
ΔSalary
ΔProperty Tax
ΔIntergovt'l Revenue
ΔPopulation
Unemployment Rate

Revenues Decrease

Full

Moderate Increase
(Increase < 13%)

Large Increase
(Increase >= 13%)

Full

Moderate Decrease
(Decrease < 8%)

Large Decrease
(Decrease >= 8%)

0.431***
(0.114)
-0.088***
(0.026)
-0.056
(0.080)
-0.042*
(0.023)
0.072
(0.049)
0.033
(0.036)
0.008***
(0.002)
-0.003***
(0.001)

0.348***
(0.049)
-0.065**
(0.027)
-0.102
(0.079)
-0.036*
(0.022)
0.011
(0.054)
0.015
(0.039)
0.006*
(0.003)
-0.003***
(0.001)

0.446***
(0.143)
-0.135***
(0.040)
0.057
(0.169)
-0.062
(0.056)
0.245**
(0.102)
0.102**
(0.086)
0.008**
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.005)

0.373***
(0.118)
-0.107***
(0.033)
-0.215
(0.152)
-0.144***
(0.051)
-0.004
(0.057)
0.149**
(0.072)
0.001
(0.005)
-0.004***
(0.002)

0.244*
(0.134)
-0.057*
(0.030)
-0.163
(0.141)
-0.097*
(0.052)
-0.019
(0.059)
0.144*
(0.084)
-0.015**
(0.007)
-0.004***
(0.001)

0.303*
(0.172)
-0.311***
(0.080)
-0.570
(0.499)
-0.357**
(0.144)
0.033
(0.157)
0.203**
(0.101)
0.000
(0.004)
0.000
(0.008)

(Year dummies’ outputs omitted)
Constant

0.045***
(0.015)

0.062***
(0.009)

0.082*
(0.046)

0.017
(0.023)

0.018
(0.024)

-0.064
(0.089)

Sample Sizes
R2

5,597
0.271

4,401
0.101

1,196
0.362

1,278
0.119

1,035
0.061

243
0.226

Note: Numbers in parentheses are Huber-White standard errors clustered by individual municipalities.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
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The first three columns of Table 6 in the table present regression estimates from
the full sample of revenue increase, the moderate revenue increase, and the large revenue
increase samples; the last three columns present regression estimates from the full
revenue decrease sample, the moderate revenue decrease, and the large revenue decrease
samples. I hypothesize that when a city experiences a large revenue change, it may rely
more on UFB to adjust expenditure changes. I define a ‘large’ revenue change if a city’s
revenue increase falls into the 75th percentile and revenue decrease falls into the 25th
percentile. In other words, I choose the top 25 percent of observations with the largest
percent revenue increase or decrease as ‘large’ revenue changes. The cutting point for
large revenue increase is 13 percent and the cutting point for large revenue decrease is 8
percent.
The first-differenced estimators provide useful information on how municipal
expenditures change in response to marginal changes in the explanatory variables.
Among all explanatory variables, ΔTR has the largest effect on expenditure changes. This
confirms my hypothesis that expenditure changes are primarily driven by revenue
changes. Holding other variables constant, when general fund revenues increase by 10
percentage points, general fund expenditures increases by 4.3 percentage points; when
total general fund revenues fall by 10 percentage points, total general fund expenditures
fall by 3.7 percentage points. This positive relationship gets stronger when revenue
changes are large. If a city has a large revenue increase, a 10-percentage-points revenue
increase causes expenditure to rise by 4.5 percentage points. The same marginal revenue
increase only causes expenditure to rise by 3.5 percentage points among cities with
moderate revenue increase. The same pattern holds for cities that experience revenue
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declines. Overall, the coefficients of ΔTR are smaller in the revenue decrease models
than those in the revenue increase models, suggesting that municipal governments use
more expenditure adjustment strategies to cope with revenue declines.
The negative coefficients of ΔUFB indicates the tradeoffs between municipal
governments’ spending and saving: more savings accumulated in the UFB slows down
expenditure growth, and withdrawing savings from the UFB pushes up expenditure
growth. In the revenue increase models where municipal governments experience
revenue surpluses, holding other variables fixed, a 10-percentage-points increase in
ΔUFB pulls down expenditure growth by 0.9 percentage points. This suggests that the
UFB absorbs revenue surplus, preventing expenditure growth caused by revenue
increase. The UFB’s role in preventing expenditure growth is greater when cities
experience larger revenue growth. In the revenue decrease models where municipal
governments face revenue shortfalls, holding other variables fixed, a 10-percentagepoints ΔUFB decrease boosts expenditure growth by 1.1 percentage points. This indicates
that the UFB releases financial slack to fill in the budget gap, preventing spending cuts
caused by revenue declines. The UFB’s role in preventing spending cuts is greater when
cities experience large revenue decrease. In all, ΔUFB always counteracts the changes of
total general fund expenditures, suggesting it stabilizes expenditures when revenues
fluctuate. The overall greater coefficients of ΔUFB in the revenue decrease models
further indicates that the UFB plays a more significant role in helping municipal
governments stabilize expenditures when they face a revenue shortfall. Since my choice
of large revenue change is arbitrary, I conduct robustness checks by choosing alternative
cutting points other than the two used in the regressions. For the revenue increase models,
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I choose 10 percent and 15 percent as the alternative cutting points of large revenue
increase; for the revenue decrease models, I choose 5 percent and 10 percent as the
alternative cutting points of large revenue decrease. Results demonstrate consistent and
similar patterns: municipal governments adjust expenditures to a greater extent during
revenue decrease and the UFB plays more important roles in expenditure adjustments
when a city responds to revenue declines. In general, the greater changes of general fund
revenues, the greater roles the UFB plays in expenditure adjustments.
Expenditure categories that restrain municipal government officials spending
discretion are expected to reduce municipal expenditure adjustments. That is to say, as
the share of debt service expenditures and the share of salary expenditures in total
expenditures increase, expenditure adjustments (ΔTE) decrease. Since debt service
expenditures restrict municipal government officials’ spending flexibility more than
salary expenditures do, I expect the size of coefficients of ΔDebt Service to be greater
than the size of coefficients of ΔSalary. The regression estimates confirm my hypotheses:
the negative signs of the coefficients of these two variables (except the coefficient of
ΔDebt Service in the large revenue increase model) suggest these two expenditure
categories restrain government officials’ spending discretion, which leads to less
expenditure adjustments. The overall larger coefficients of ΔDebt Service than the
coefficients of ΔSalary reflect debt service expenditures’ non-discretionary nature,
although these ΔDebt Service regression estimates are not statistically significant. The
non-significant estimates of ΔDebt Service are probably due to the small share of debt
service expenditures in total expenditures and the little change of the year-to-year ΔDebt
Service. As shown in Table 5 Panel A, debt service expenditures count less than 5
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percent in total expenditures. Changes in such a small share in total expenditures may not
affect government officials’ spending flexibility. In addition, Table 5 Panel B shows that
ΔDebt Service has little variation compared to other variables. One disadvantage of the
first-differenced equation model is that variables with little year-to-year variation cannot
be estimated with precision. For ΔSalary, its effects on municipal expenditure
adjustments are greater in the revenue decrease models. Holding other variables fixed, if
the share of salary expenditures decreases by 10 percentage points during revenue
shortfalls, municipal governments’ total general fund expenditures increases by 1.4
percentage points. The negative signs of this variables indicate municipal governments
adjust salary expenditures to stabilize the overall general fund expenditures.
A greater share of property tax revenues in total revenues is expected to stabilize
municipal revenues, which leads to a lower need in expenditure adjustments. Regression
estimates on ΔProperty Tax do not seem to support this hypothesis. The coefficients of
ΔProperty Tax are positive in the revenue increase models, though only in the large
revenue increase model the coefficient shows statistical significance. The coefficients of
ΔProperty Tax are negative in the full and moderate revenue decrease models, and is
positive in the large revenue decrease model. None of these estimates in the revenue
decrease models are statistically significant. I cannot make any meaningful statistical
inference based on these imprecise results. One possible explanation is that in states
which have passed any form of tax and expenditure limitation rules, local government
officials cannot change property tax rates without voters’ approval. This restricts
government officials from adjusting the millet rates or the assessed property values to
reach their desired property tax yields. Another possible explanation is that there is
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relatively small year-to-year changes in property tax revenues during the study period.
How the property tax affects municipal expenditure stabilization needs further
exploration in future studies.
The effects of ΔIntergovernmental Revenue on ΔTE are relatively consistent.
Overall, a greater share of intergovernmental revenues increases the need of expenditure
adjustments. The effects are larger during revenue shortfalls. When a city experiences a
revenue decrease, if its share of intergovernmental revenues increases by 10 percentage
points, the city’s general fund expenditures would further fall by 1.5 percentage points.
The effect of population growth on changes in municipal general fund
expenditures are positive when revenues rise. This confirms my hypothesis that a city
with a growing population needs to provide more public goods and services to meet local
residents’ growing demands, which inevitably pushes up expenditures.
The negative coefficients of state unemployment rate in all of the models also
confirms my hypothesis. Increase in unemployment rate indicates a declining economy.
Municipal expenditure growth is more likely to slow down as the overall economic
condition gets worse. This model uses state unemployment rates to capture the impact of
general economic conditions. This is not a precise measure of local economic conditions.
Future studies should try to use an economic measure that matches local conditions
better.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine how municipal governments adjust expenditures in
response to changes in revenues. I find that, on average, municipal governments smooth
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their expenditures substantially so that expenditures do not change as much as revenues
do. I also find that financial slack (UFB) is an important expenditure stabilization tool in
municipal financial management. Different from previous studies which examine the
beginning-of-year UFB’s effect on expenditure stabilization over the course of business
cycles, I shift the research focus to examine how marginal changes in the UFB help
municipal governments stabilize their year-to-year expenditures in order to dissect the
mechanism of the UFB’s expenditure stabilization effects. I find that changes in the UFB
always counteract the changes of total general fund expenditures, suggesting that the
UFB plays an expenditure stabilization role: when a municipal government has a revenue
surplus, the UFB absorbs part of the surplus, avoiding excessive expenditure growth
caused by revenue increase; when a municipal government encounters a revenue
shortfall, UFB releases financial slack to fill in the budget gap, mitigating dramatic
spending cuts. The UFB’s expenditure stabilization roles are more significant when
municipal governments experience a revenue decrease, or when the revenue changes are
large. These findings provide strong evidence that UFB works as an expenditure
stabilization tool in municipal governments, complementing prior studies on local
government counter-cyclical expenditure stabilization policies. I also find evidence that
spending flexibility affects municipal governments’ expenditure adjustments. This
finding provides evidence to support organization theory’s view on financial slack—it
can be used as a cushion to buffer against the risk factors a government faces. This study
uses the first-differenced equation model which addresses important statistical issues
such as omitted fixed effects and serial correlations in the dependent and explanatory
variables. The limitation of this model is that it cannot make precise estimations on

87

variables with little year-to-year change. Future studies should examine the effects of
such variables (i.e. debt service expenditures, and property tax revenues) on municipal
expenditure adjustments.
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CHAPTER 4
FINANCIAL SLACK AND MUNICIPAL SHORT-TERM BORROWING

4.1 Introduction
Cash flow problems are a common issue in many municipal governments. During
the normal course of a fiscal year, the day-to-day revenue and expenditure flows of a
governmental unit are rarely equal. Many governments receive lump sum, scheduled
payments of major revenue sources once or twice a year, or at quarterly intervals. On the
other hand, operating expenditures, especially recurring expenses such as personnel costs
are roughly constant throughout the fiscal year. Figure 8 presents City of San Diego’s
general fund cash flows to illustrate this problem. The city receives property taxes from
the County of San Diego twice every fiscal year,12 creating two bulges in its cash flow-in
trend: one in December and January, and the other in May and June. On the expenditure
side, except May and July, its monthly cash disbursements are pretty constant over the
course of the year. The consequence of the mismatch between cash flow-ins and flowouts is temporary cash shortfalls during a fiscal year. As shown in Figure 9, in absence of
any cash management strategy, the City would have a negative end-of-month cash
balance seven out of twelve months.

The property taxes paid to County of San Diego are “delinquent after December 10 and April 10,
respectively.” The City receives its shared property taxes from the County afterwards. See City of San
Diego’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2013, page 65.
12
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Figure 8. City of San Diego’s General Fund Cash Flows, Fiscal Year 2013 ($’000)
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Figure 9. City of San Diego’s End-of-Month General Fund Cash Balances, Fiscal Year
2013 ($’000)
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Managing government cash flows is not simply a technical problem, but a critical
issue in municipal financial management. For a municipal government, failure in meeting
its obligations of matured bond principal and interest payments or in funding
expenditures in a timely manner could cause catastrophic problems. To manage cash
flows, municipal governments can use either internal financial resources such as financial
slack they have accumulated or external financing tools such as short-term borrowing if
permitted by the state government. If both options are available, how do municipal
governments choose between internal financing and external financing? Do they prefer
one financing instrument to another? In this chapter of the dissertation, I apply a theory—
the pecking order theory—commonly used in corporate financial management studies
that explains firms’ preference ranking over various financial resources in the context of
municipal governments. I examine whether a pecking order of preference over internal
and external financial resources also exists in municipal governments, and whether
financial slack reduces municipal short-term borrowing. The discussion proceeds in six
sections: following the introduction section, section two introduces the pecking order
theory and its applications in prior research. Section three develops a theoretical model of
municipal short-term borrowing. Section four introduces data sources, describes the
California sample, and discusses appropriate methods. The final two sections interpret
regression results and imply findings of this study for the theories and practices of
municipal fiscal management.
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4.2 Pecking Order Theory and Governments’ Preference over Financial Resources
4.2.1 Theories of Capital Structure: the Trade-Off Theory vs. the Pecking Order
Theory
The theories of organizational capital structure and financing decision-making can
be synthesized into two dominant theories—the trade-off theory and the pecking order
theory. The trade-off theory describes a family of related theories that assume that firms
seek an optimal capital structure through a tradeoff between the tax advantages of issuing
debt and the costs of financial distress when the debt burden is too high (Modigliani and
Miller, 1958). The major benefits associated with debt issuance include the tax benefits
on debt interest payments, and the mitigation of cash flow problems. The primary costs of
debt include debt interest payments, fees associated with a bond issue (e.g. fees for
underwriters, rating agencies, etc.), bankruptcy costs, and agency costs. A valuemaximizing firm seeks to maintain a capital structure that the marginal costs of debt
equal its marginal benefit. This theory predicts that firms have target capital structure and
they adjust gradually toward an optimal debt ratio.
An alternative theory that explains organizational capital structure is the pecking
order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). In the pecking order theory, there is
no well-defined optimal debt ratio. Changes in debt ratios are driven by the need for
external funds, not by any attempt to reach an optimal capital structure. The pecking
order theory suggests that information asymmetry between owners/managers and
investors creates a preference ranking over financial sources: internal funds first,
followed by debt, and then equity. Firms follow this pecking order of financing in order
to minimize adverse selection costs. Due to information asymmetry, owners and
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managers of a firm know the true value of the firm’s assets and growth potential.
Investors can only guess these values. In most cases, if a firm is overvalued by the
market, the managers of the firm will be happy to sell equity whereas the managers of an
undervalued firm will not. This suggests a potential adverse selection problem in the
corporate stock market (Leary and Roberts 2004; Goyal and Frank 2008). If a firm offers
to sell equity, investors may view it as a negative signal regarding the quality of the
equity and the firms’ value (Baskin 1989). Therefore, firms prefer internal financial
sources the most because using internal sources avoids the information asymmetry and
underinvestment problems. When internal financial resources are insufficient to meet the
financing need, firms first turn to risk-free debt, then risky debt, and finally equity.
Firms’ pecking order behavior may also be explained by agency costs (Myers 2003). The
agency theory argues that if managers search for external financial sources, they have to
explain project details to outside investors and keep administration more transparent. This
unavoidably exposes themselves to investor monitoring. Managers dislike this process
and therefore they prefer using internal financial resources over external financing (Goyal
and Frank 2008).
4.2.2 The Modified Pecking Order Theory and Its Applications
Neither the trade-off theory nor the pecking order theories could tell a full story of
organizations’ capital structure and their financing decision-making (Leary and Roberts
2010). Nevertheless, some researchers find that the pecking order is “a much better firstcut explanation of the debt-equity choice” (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999, 221). The
pecking order is a good descriptor of firms’ financial behavior (Titman and Wessels
1988; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Leary and Roberts 2004; Lemmon and Zender
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2010). In Leary and Roberts’ recent study, they find that 77 percent of the firms in their
sample follow the pecking order in choosing between internal and external finance (Leary
and Roberts 2010). Some organizations such as nonprofit organizations do not have
equity. Researchers describe a more liberal interpretation of the theory—the “modified
(or dynamic) pecking order theory”—which relaxes the ordering of the hierarchy’s
second rung, the choice between debt and equity, only examining the preference order of
internal and external financial resources. The modified pecking order theory sometimes is
used to explain nonprofit organizations’ capital structure and borrowing decisions.
Scholars find evidence that nonprofit organizations also follow a pecking order of
preference over financing sources: internal funds are preferred over external borrowing
(Bowman 2002, Denison 2009, Yan, Denison, and Butler 2009, Calabrese 2011).
Governments, similar to nonprofit organizations, do not have equity. It seems that
the modified pecking order theory might be used to study governments’ financial
management behaviors. However to my best knowledge, there is no study in public
financial management that applies the modified pecking order theory to explain
governments’ borrowing decision and their capital structure. This chapter of the
dissertation presents the first known study that tests the application of the pecking order
and modified pecking order theories from firms and nonprofit organizations to municipal
governments, and examines whether municipal governments also have a pecking order
preference when managing their cash flows.
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4.2.3 The Internal and External Financial Resources of Municipal Governments
In the management literature, the internal financial resources refer to cash,
investment income, and other fungible resources a firm holds. External financial
resources are those raised from external security issues (Myers and Majluf 1984; Baskin
1989; Goyal and Frank 2008). In the government context, the internal financial resources
refer to financial slack a government has accumulated, and the external financial
resources are those raised from municipal security issues—government debt financing.
As introduced in Chapter One, financial slack are accounting-based excess resources
available to a government. It occurs when actual revenues exceed actual expenditures in a
particular fiscal period, often caused by random errors in budget estimations and the
conservative forecasting bias. In the previous two chapters, I examine factors that
determine a municipal governments’ financial slack accumulation, and financial slack’s
role in municipal expenditure stabilization, respectively. In this chapter, I examine how
financial slack affects a city’s borrowing behavior by studying municipal governments’
preference over internal financial resources (i.e. financial slack) and external financial
resources (i.e. debt financing).
In the United States, subnational governments finance their current expenditures
primarily by tax revenues such as property and sales taxes and non-tax revenues such as
charges and fees. When a government cannot raise enough tax or non-tax revenues to
cover its expenditures in a short time manner, it can increase liquidity through debt
financing by issuing municipal securities. Municipal securities include “a bond, note,
warrant, certificate of participation or other obligation issued by a state or local
government or their agencies or authorities” according to the Municipal Securities
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Rulemaking Board (MSRB).13 When municipal securities qualify for federal income tax
exemption—interest or other investment earnings on them are excluded from gross
income of the investors (bondholders)—the issuing government can borrow at much
lower interest rates than taxable corporate securities. By the fourth quarter of 2015, the
U.S. state and local governments have accumulated outstanding municipal securities of
over $2.96 trillion, equal to 16.5 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (Federal Reserve
Board of Governors 2016).
The majority of municipal securities issued by subnational government are in the
form of bonds. Bonds are characterized by their long-term maturity schedules. A typical
long-term bond matures in more than 15 years from issuance.14 Bonds are generally used
to finance capital investments. The reasons are capital assets are usually high-priced
items, and financing such assets by pay-as-you-go (pay-go) approach requires large initial
cash outlays which may cause a considerable tax rate increase or saving idle cash (slack)
over several years. The pay-go financing approach may also impose an intergenerational
inequity problem with current residents bearing its costs, while future residents enjoy the
benefits. In addition, the pay-go method may cause the over-exhaustion of a tax base in
the asset acquisition or construction period. Therefore, capital assets are usually financed
through debt that matches the life range of the assets.
Notes are distinguished from bonds by their short maturity length. Notes usually
mature in one year or less, although sometimes notes with longer maturities are also

Source: “Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms” The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. Updated
August 2013. Source: http://www.msrb.org/glossary.aspx (Accessed on April 4, 2016).
14
Ibid.
13
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issued.15 Notes are issued when the liquidity is low and repaid when available cash
balances are expected to be strong. Governments issue notes primarily for cash
management purposes—to offset the temporary cash deficit caused by the mismatched
revenue schedule and expenditure schedule. Such notes are called cash flow management
notes, including grant anticipation notes (GANs), tax anticipation notes (TANs), revenue
anticipation notes (RANs), and tax and revenue anticipation notes (TRANs).
Governments also issue short-term notes to provide interim financing for long-term
capital investment projects (Trogen 2000; Fitch Ratings 2015). These notes are generally
in the form of bond anticipation notes (BANs), construction loan notes (CLNs), or other
forms of commercial papers (CPs). BANs are issued in anticipation of long-term bonds.
CLNs are issued to fund construction of projects, and are repaid from bond proceeds or
some pre-arranged commitment. CPs usually mature with 270 days, and they are often
backed by a line of credit with a bank.16 In this study, I focus on the cash management
notes only since the research interest of this chapter is to examine municipal
governments’ preference over internal and external financial resources when managing
their cash flows.
4.3 A Model of Municipal Short-Term Borrowing
I develop a model of municipal short-term borrowing which incorporates the
amount of cash management notes issued by an individual municipal government in a
particular fiscal year as a percentage of its total operating expenditures as the dependent
variable (labeled as 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ), and unreserved general fund balance as a percentage of its

15
16

Ibid.
Ibid.
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total operating expenditures as the independent variable (labeled as 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ). In the later
regression analysis, 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is lagged by one year to measure a city’s beginning-of-year
financial slack (labeled as 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 ). The model also incorporates several control
variables that are hypothesized to affect a city’s dependence on short-term borrowing,
including a municipal government’s institutional, fiscal, demographic characteristics as
well as some key features of the notes issued by government, and economic and market
condition indicators. The general structure of the model is expressed:
𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚,𝑡 ,
𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 )

(13)

A government’s fiscal policy space refers to the freedom government officials can
operate, decide, and create fiscal policy; in other words, how many options or tools
government officials can use to solve financial problems (Pagano and Hoene 2010). For
municipal governments, their fiscal policy space is usually determined by state
governments’ restrictions on local fiscal policies (Hendrick and Crawford 2014). Most of
these constraints take the form of tax and expenditure limitations. In California, the
passage of its Proposition 13 in 1978 changed local governments’ fiscal policy space as it
shifted the control of property taxes (property value assessment and property tax revenue
allocation) from local governments to the state (Shires 1999; Hoene 2004). Under
Proposition 13, the assessed property value was rolled back and frozen at the 1976
assessed level. Increases in property value assessment should be no more than 2 percent
per year as long as the property is not sold; once sold, the property is reassessed at
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1percent of the sale price, and the 2 percent yearly increase cap becomes applicable to
future years. Any new special tax from local governments must be passed by a two-thirds
vote of the electorate (Hoene 2004). These limitations however, may not apply to
municipalities that have adopted a city charter. The California State Constitution allows
cities to adopt city charters, and local governments can gain more fiscal policy space
once they obtain the charter. Compared to the general law cities, charter cities have
broader assessment power and taxation powers (for example, imposing real property
transfer tax). They have supreme authorities over local expenditures, land use and zoning
decisions, and municipal contracts. They also have the freedom to choose form of
government, methods of elections, voting requirements, personnel matters, and among
others.17 As of July 1, 2011, among the 482 incorporated cities in California, 121 cities
are charter cities, and the rest are general law cities.18 To examine how fiscal policy space
factor influences municipal short-term borrowing, I include 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 in the model.
This variable is coded 1 if a municipal government is a charter city in a particular fiscal
year; 0 if it is a general law city.
A government’s fiscal structure denotes its key financial characteristics, such as
revenue sources, tax burden, debt structure, levels of fund balance, and so forth
(Hendrick and Crawford 2014). Proposition 13 has changed Californian municipal
governments’ fiscal structures. Cities in California shifted their dependence on property
tax revenue to a diversity of revenue sources, particularly to charges and miscellaneous

Source: “General Law City v. Charter City” League of California Cities.
http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Resources-Section/Charter-Cities/Chart_General_Law_v_Charter_Cities-07-26-11 (Accessed on April 4, 2016).
18
“Charter City List” League of California Cities. http://www.cacities.org/Resources/Charter-Cities
(Accessed on April 4, 2016).
17
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revenues. Researchers find that between 1978 and 1995, total charges and miscellaneous
revenues of California cities grew by nearly 400 percent (Shires 1999). There is little
change in expenditure structure. However, one notable change in expenditure shares is
the interest paid on outstanding debt, which increased from 3 percent to 8 percent
between 1972 and 2002 (Hoene 2004). Changes in revenue structures inevitably
influence how municipal governments manage their financial resources. To capture the
impact of fiscal structure on municipal governments’ short-term borrowing, I include five
fiscal structure factors in the model as described below.
The first measure is dependence on intergovernmental revenue. Financial
professionals and researchers have recognized that over dependence on
intergovernmental revenues is a risk factor in municipal finance because the amount of
aid from the state and federal government and the time of aid disbursement are not under
the control of municipal government (Bowman, Calia, and Metzgar 1999; Hendrick
2006). To make things worse, state governments often reduce the amount of aid or delay
the disbursement during economic recessions when municipal governments are in greater
need of such revenue (Hoene 2009). Dependence on intergovernmental revenues adds
uncertainty to municipal revenue estimation and sometimes creates cash flow problems in
municipal financial management. This suggests that municipal governments with greater
dependence on intergovernmental revenues may need more internal and/or external
financial resources to manage their cash flows. I use revenues received from state and
county governments as a percentage of total municipal revenues to measure this variable,
and label it 𝐼𝐺 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 .
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The second measure is revenue diversification calculated by a reversed
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on five primary own-source general revenues:
property taxes (include secured and unsecured property taxes, and supplemental property
taxes), sales and transient lodging taxes, franchises and business license taxes, real
property transfer taxes, and other taxes (include utility users tax, construction
development taxes, and admission taxes). Calculation of revenue diversification is shown
below. The value of this index ranges from 0 to 1 with increasing values indicating
greater revenue diversification. Effective revenue diversification is considered to reduce
revenue volatility (Carroll 2009). Municipal governments with stable revenue streams
may need less short-term debt to balance their cash flows.
𝑅𝐷 =

1−∑5𝑗=1 𝑅𝑗2
1−

(14)

1
5

Non-discretionary spending categories such as salary expenditures and debt
service expenditures restrict a municipal government’s spending flexibility and may
increase demands in short-term borrowing to manage cash flows. I include 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡
measured as salary expenditures as a percentage of total municipal operating
expenditures, and 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 measured as expenditures on debt principal retirement,
interests, and other financial charges as a percentage of total municipal operating
expenditures in the model. The last fiscal structural factor is 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 measured as
per capital long-term debt outstanding. Debt burden influences municipal short-term
borrowing in two ways: on one hand, higher current debt burden may reduce a
government’s future debt issuance capacity; on the other hand, more long-term debt
outstanding is associated with higher interest payments on debt, indicating that a
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municipal government may have higher demand in issuing notes to manage its cash
flows. How debt burden affects a city’s short-term borrowing will be tested in the
empirical analysis.
The size of a city may affect its access to the municipal securities market, as
smaller cities sometimes face more restrictions on debt issuance. City size is also
associated with the independent variable—𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 . Findings in Chapter Two of this
dissertation and previous studies suggest that smaller cities generally accumulate more
financial slack (Hendrick 2006; Marlowe 2012). I include the natural logarithm of
population to control the impact of city size.
Municipal financial activities are open to the general economy. Therefore, the
local economic condition and the municipal securities market condition directly shape
municipal finance and financial management. Municipal revenues tend to move with the
ebb and flow of local economic activities. When local economy booms, municipal
revenues increase due to the strong tax base; while local economy is in recession,
municipal governments receive fewer revenues due to shrinking tax base and are more
likely to suffer financial stress. I use the unemployment rate of the county where the city
locates to control for the general economic condition.
The municipal securities market condition is also taken into account in the
model—lower yields indicate lower borrowing cost for municipal governments and this
may give some incentive for municipal governments to take advantage of securities
market. The Bond Buyer publishes indices on a weekly basis for general obligation
bonds, revenue bonds, and notes. These indices reflect the average estimated yields of the
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bonds or notes. I use the Bond Buyer’s One-Year Note Index to measure the overall
municipal securities market condition.
The model also includes note interest rate charged on a particular transaction to
capture the cost of short-term borrowing. I hypothesize that if a city can borrow at lower
interest rates, it might issue more notes to take advantage of the low borrowing costs.
4.4 Data Sources, Sample Description, and Methodology
4.4.1 Data Sources and Sample Creation
This model is tested using a sample of cities in California. I choose California
cities to study this subject for three reasons. First, California is among those states where
local governments actively issue notes for cash management purpose. Second, California
is among the very few states that release its local governments’ short-term debt issuance
information. Third, California has the largest population and economy in the United
States, making this study significant even though it is not a nationwide study. In addition,
the California Constitution gives its cities the authority to become charter cities. Charter
cities have much more local controls than the general law cities, and they have supreme
authority over municipal affairs.19 This provides an opportunity to examine how
institutional factors affect municipal governments’ financial management options.
I compile information from various sources. The two primary data sources are the
California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC)’s Debt Issuance
Database and the California State Controller’s website. California state law requires that

Source: “Charter Cities: A Quick Summary for the Press and Researchers” League of California Cities.
http://www.cacities.org/Resources/Charter-Cities (Accessed on April 4, 2016).
19
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all governmental agencies which issue debt should report information on each issuance to
the CDIAC.20 In 2006, the CDIAC launched a publicly accessible database that includes
comprehensive information on bonds, notes, and other public debt sold or issued by the
State and all of its local governmental agencies. The information includes issue dates,
issuer, type of bond issuance, and financial characteristics associated with each bond sale
such as interest costs, sale type, sources of payment, and others. Data is available from
1984 to the present, and is updated monthly. This database is especially valuable for the
study of short-term borrowing. Some alternative data sources may provide information on
government notes issuance. For example, the Census Bureau’s Local Government
Finance database reports the year-end note outstanding. However, because most of the
notes are paid off within 12 months, the year-end note outstanding does not tell much
about the amount of notes that have been issued during the year, but rather the amount of
outstanding notes that are carried to the next fiscal year. The note issuance information
reported in the CDIAC’s database provides a much accurate measure of the amount of
short-term debt issued by a municipal government in a particular fiscal year.
The CDIAC’s Debt Issuance Database does not report municipal revenues,
expenditures, assets, liabilities, fund balances, and other financial information. I obtain
such information from the California State Controller’s open data website. Cities in
California are required by law to report their financial data in paper format to the
Controller within 90 days after the close of the fiscal year, or in the required electronic
format within 110 days. The Controller’s office reviews, compiles, and publishes the

Source: “Government Code 8855(k) and 8855(i)” State of California Lenitive Counsel.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=gov&group=08001-09000&file=8855-8859
(Accessed April 4, 2016).
20

107

annual financial transaction reports. I obtain the list of California charter cities from the
League of California Cities’ website, each city’s population information from the
California Department of Finance’s website, the county level unemployment rates from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ website, and the one-year note index from the Bond
Buyer’s website.
4.4.2 Sample Selection and Selection Bias
I draw a sample of 478 California cities that include key information captured by
the various sources mentioned above. Four cities are left out, either because they were
incorporated after 2010, or there is obvious data error or missing data.21 Due the change
in definition of unreserved general fund balance (UFB) required by GASB Statement No.
54, I restrict the time span of the sample between fiscal years 2003 and 2011 to avoid
potential measurement inconsistency on fund balance. Regarding the issuance of shortterm debts, I restrict the sample to include cash management notes only, excluding all
other types of notes such as projects notes, notes for single or multiple family housing,
equipment, utility, and among other purposes. Among the 478 cities in California, 420
cities (or 88%) have never issued any cash management notes from fiscal years 2003
through 2011. Fifty-eight cities issued 209 cash management notes during the study
period. Seventeen of them issued cash management notes only once, and five cities have
issued cash management notes every year during the nine years.22 Table 7 presents a

21

These four cities are: City of Jurupa Valley (incorporated on July 1, 2011), City of Eastvale (incorporated
on October 1, 2010), City of Escalon (multiple years of negative general fund operating expenditures), and
City of Paso Robles (key financial information is missing).
22
These five cities are: City of Berkeley, City of Los Angeles, City of Oakland, City of San Diego, and
City of Selma.
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detailed distribution of cash management notes issued by California cities between fiscal
years 2003 and 2011.

Table 7. Cash Flow Notes Issuances Distribution, FY2003-FY2011
Number of Note
Issuances

Number
of Cities

Column 1 ×
Column 2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total

17
12
5
5
5
3
3
3
5
58

17
24
15
20
25
18
21
24
45
209

Percent
8.1
11.5
7.2
9.6
12.0
8.6
10.0
11.5
21.5

Cumulative
Percent
8.1
19.6
26.8
36.4
48.4
57.0
67.0
78.5
100.0
100.0

The fact that a large number of cities never issue cash management notes raises a
concern of potential selection bias in the sample. Sample selection bias arises when a
researcher does not observe a random sample of a population of interest. In other words,
observations on the dependent variable are not missing randomly, but conditional on
some variables. One such example is the effect of education on women’s wages where
the dependent variable can only be observed when an individual female participates in
the labor market. Without any correction, samples with selection bias often lead to
inconsistent estimators and biased inferences (Heckman 1979). Similar in this study of
municipal short-term borrowing, observations on the dependent variable (i.e. Note) can
only be observed if a city has issued cash management notes. The issuance of cash
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management notes by these cities is not random, but rather depends on several factors.
For example, in California, charter cities often enjoy more fiscal policy space than the
general law cities. Due to the more fiscal tools they have, they may not need to
accumulate as much financial slack to manage cash flows as the general law cities do.
This will affect their need in short-term debt financing. It is also reasonable to
hypothesize that cities that face greater fiscal stress are more likely to issue cash
management notes. To compare whether cities that issue cash management notes
significantly differ from those which do not, I conduct a two-sample t-test to compare
cities that have issued cash management notes and those that have not over some key
municipal characteristics variables. Results in Table 8 show that charter cities, cities with
more population, less financial slack, more diversified revenue sources, greater shares of
salary expenditures and debt service expenditures are more likely to issue cash
management notes. This suggest that selection bias exists in this sample.

Table 8. Two-Sample T-Test of Cash Flow Notes Issuance
Variable

Charter City
Population
Financial Slack
Intergovernmental Revenue
Revenue Diversification
Salary
Debt Interest
Debt Burden

Mean
Cities without
Cities with
Note Issuance Note Issuance
0.24
48,89
41.19
6.27
0.74
32.54
2.47
846.33

0.49
337,84
9.52
5.35
0.79
39.88
4.12
80.48
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Difference

t-Statistics

-0.25
-288,95
31.67
0.92
-0.05
-7.34
-1.65
756.86

-8.15
-21.68
8.81
1.51
-5.33
-8.86
-7.60
0.26

4.4.3 Heckman Selection Model
Researchers use models to take account of sample selection bias. Among those
widely used models in social science literature is the Heckman selection model. The
Heckman selection model is a type of Tobit model that treats selection bias as an omitted
variable bias. The first stage of this model is to create a selection equation and estimate
the probability that a city would issue cash management notes. Then a statistically
adjusted value (inverse mills ratio) is calculated for each observation based on the
expected error from the selection equation. In the second stage, the model that examines
whether financial slack reduces the amount of cash management notes issuances includes
inverse mills ratio as an explanatory variable. The results—the Heckman estimators—are
thus adjusted from self-selection bias (details see Heckman 1979).
Variables used in the first stage selection model are: 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝐼𝐺 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡 , and 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 . These
variables are expected to affect a city’s probability to issue cash management notes. The
second stage estimation model includes all variables used in the first stage except
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 because a city (or town) charter may influence a city’s access to the
municipal securities market, and hence its probability to issue notes; but it does not
necessarily determine how much notes a city issues. The amount of notes issuance is
more likely dependent upon a city’s fiscal stress over cash flows. The second stage model
also includes one variable that is not included in the selection equation—interest rate at
notes issuance (𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 ). The note interest rates reported in the CDIAC database
are either calculated based on net interest cost (NIC) or true interest cost (TIC). TIC and
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NIC are similar, except that TIC takes into account the time value of money. The longer
it takes for a bond to mature and the more interest payment periods are involved, the
greater difference between NIC interest rate and TIC interest rate. In recent years, TIC
interest rates are gaining more popularity among researchers as a proper measure of bond
costs (Hildreth and Zorn 2005). Unfortunately, the note information in the CDIAC
database is not sufficient to convert all interest rates into a uniform one. However, this is
less of an issue for notes than for long-term bonds. Most notes mature within a year, and
interest is payable at maturity without redemption prior to maturity. The short maturity
length and single interest payment period indicate that conceptually, the difference
between NIC interest rate and TIC interest should be negligible. A few cities reported
both NIC and TIC interest rates in the CDIAC database in Fiscal Year 2012. These cases
confirm my assumption that the differences between the two interest rates are subtle. The
next section presents descriptive statistics on municipal financial slack and note issuance
by California cities and the Heckman estimators of municipal short-term borrowing.
4.5 Findings
4.5.1 An Overview of Financial Slack Accumulation and Notes Issuance by
California Cities
In organizational theory, slack is considered a crucial buffer which protects
organizations from uncertainty and risks (Levinthal and March 1981; Moe 1984).
Further, the pecking order theory believes that financial slack (internal fund) is preferred
by financial managers compared to debt and equity (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf
1984). From an organizational perspective, accumulating financial slack is a good
management strategy. A commonly cited standard suggests that governments should
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maintain rainy day funds approximately five percent of the general fund expenditures
(Joyce 2001). The GFOA recommends that the “five-percent rule” should only be an
appropriate benchmark for very large cities, and the majority of cities should maintain
unrestricted general fund balance no less than fifteen percent of regular general fund
operating revenues or expenditures (Gauthier 2009). Figure 10 demonstrates the trend of
average financial slack accumulation by California cities between fiscal years 2003 and
2011. The trend of slack accumulation shows a clear pro-cyclical pattern: during
economic expansions (FY2003 – FY2007), cities increased their financial slack levels,
and the accumulated slack peaked when the economy reached the summit in FY2007.
Slack declined significantly in the Great Recession of 2007-2009. When the economy
recovered from recession, slack accumulation recovered accordingly. During the nine
years, California cities accumulate UFB about 39.6 percent of total operating
expenditures (or 4.7 months of total general fund operating expenditures). The procyclical slack accumulation pattern of California cities is comparable with the national
slack accumulation trend (see Figure 2 in Chapter Two). However, California cities’
financial slack level is way beyond the GFOA’s recommended 15 percent benchmark (or
5 percent for the very large cities). In Chapter Two of the dissertation, based on a
nationwide sample of cities, I find that on average, American cities accumulated UFB
about 20 percent of operating expenditures between fiscal years 2003 and 2011.
California’s cities accumulated almost twice as much financial slack during the same
period.
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Figure 10. Average (Mean) Financial Slack Accumulation by California Cities (%UFB)

There are some possible explanations of California cities’ above the national
average financial slack accumulation. Findings in Chapter Two and several previous
studies show that smaller cities accumulate more financial slack. It is possible that the
California sample includes a larger proportion of smaller cities. To investigate this
possibility, I compare the population distributions of the two samples. Table 9 shows that
in general, cities in the California sample are smaller than cities in the nationwide sample.
However, the city size difference in the two sample is marginal and the two samples have
pretty comparable population distributions. This indicates that the difference in city sizes
in the two samples is not the primary explanation of California cities’ above national

114

average financial slack level. Another possible explanation is California’s Proposition 13
which restricts the state and local governments’ revenue raising capacity. Cities that are
affected by Proposition 13 cannot take advantage of the rising property values because
the growth rate of assessed property values is capped. Government officials cannot adjust
tax revenues by changing the millage rates without voters’ approval. The restriction in
revenue raising capacity and the loss in revenue adjustment flexibility probably motivate
these cities’ government officials to accumulate more financial slack in order to increase
their management discretion.

Table 9. Population Distributions of the Two Samples
California Sample

Nationwide Sample

Mean

63,104

69,954

1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

99 ~ 10,756
10,761 ~ 28,281
28,301 ~ 64,635
64,679 ~ 3.8 million

33 ~ 14,000
14,002 ~ 28,522
28,531 ~ 60,649
60,652 ~ 8.4 million

Regarding notes issuance, during this nine-year period, 58 cities have issued 209
notes for cash management purpose. Nine cities issued notes more than once within a
fiscal year. For data analysis purpose, I consider the multiple note issuances within a
fiscal year as only one, taking the sum of multiple principals as the total principal, and the
weighted average interest rate as the interest rate, and the weighted average maturity
length as the maturity length. Figure 11 presents the average cash management notes
issued by California cities between 2003 and 2011. The trend of note issuances
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demonstrates a relatively constant upward slope, with a peak of notes issuance in fiscal
year 2009, when the U.S. economy was in the midst of the Great Recession.
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Figure 11. Average (Mean) Cash Management Notes Issuance by California Cities
(Millions $)

The majority of these notes are issued in the form of tax and revenue anticipation
notes (TRANs). Most of these notes are paid by general fund revenues. Negotiated sale is
the dominant way of notes sales, and most cities choose net interest costs (NIC) to
measure the costs. Among cities that issued cash flow notes, the mean average amount of
principals issued by an individual city in a fiscal year is $58.5 million, with the smallest
principal amount of $250,000 and the largest principal amount of $1.26 billion. The mean
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average interest rate for these notes is 2.29%. On average, these notes matured in 366
days, with the shortest maturity length of 49 days, and longest mature length of 411 days.
Table 10 presents the detailed descriptive statistics of cash management notes issued by
California cities during the study period.
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of Note Issuance by California Cities (FY2003~FY2011)

Principal Amount (million $)
Interest Rate (%)
Maturity Length (days)

Forms of Notes
Tax and Revenue Anticipation Notes (TRANs)
Tax Anticipation Notes (TANs)
Revenue Anticipation Notes (RANs)
Repayment Sources
General Fund Revenues
Property Tax Revenues
Intergovernmental Transfers
Sales Types
Competitive Sales
Negotiated Sales
Interest Types
Net Interest Costs (NIC)
True Interest Costs (TIC)
Variable Interest Rates

Median

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

6.36
1.95
379

58.5
2.29
366

182
1.37
50

0.25
0.08
49

1,260
9.00
411

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

206
2
1

98.56
0.96
0.48

98.56
99.52
100

205
3
1

98.09
1.44
0.48

98.09
99.53
100.00

48
161

22.97
77.03

22.97
100.00

135
69
5

64.59
33.01
2.39

64.59
97.61
100.00
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4.5.2 Does Financial Slack Reduce Municipal Short-Term Borrowing?
The modified pecking order theory predicts that managers prefer internal funds to
external funds, and hence financial slack might reduce a city’s need of short-term
borrowing. I use a Heckman selection model to examine the impact of beginning-of-year
financial slack on municipal cash flow note issuance. All coefficients are robust
estimators obtained by using the cluster option that specifies to which group (i.e. city)
each observation belongs to. This cluster option relaxes the usual requirement of
independent observations—observations are independent across groups (clusters) but not
necessary within groups. Table 11 reports the Heckman estimators and the associated
robust standard errors and z statistics.
The coefficients on beginning-of-year financial slack are negatively significant at
both stages, suggesting that financial slack not only lowers a city’s probability to issue
cash management notes, but also reduces the principal amount of the notes issued in a
fiscal year. The second stage coefficient on beginning-of-year financial slack shows that
when UFB as percentage of total operating expenditures increases by 10 percentage
points, the principal amount of notes as percentage of total general fund revenue
decreases by 1.88 percentage points. Considering the mean average general fund of $41
million (or median average general fund revenue of $14.5 million) among California
cities, the 1.88 percentage points drop in cash management notes equals about $770,800
decrease (or $261,000 decrease) in total principal amount of notes.
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Table 11. Heckman Estimators on Notes Issuance
Coefficient

Robust Std. Err.

Z Statistics

-0.188**
-0.020
-0.853
-0.003
0.587**
0.360***
-0.244
0.752
0.214
1.426

0.083
0.112
9.416
0.003
0.250
0.113
0.676
1.141
0.516
1.130

-2.25
-0.18
-0.09
-1.05
2.35
3.20
-0.36
0.66
0.41
1.26

Second Stage
Financial Slack (beginning of year)
Intergovernmental Revenue
Revenue Diversification
Debt Burden
Debt Interest Expenses
Salary Burden
Note Interest Rate
Log of Population
Unemployment Rate
Note Index
First Stage (Selection Model)
Financial Slack (beginning of year)
Charter City
Intergovernmental Revenue
Revenue Diversification
Debt Burden
Debt Interest Expenses
Salary Burden
Log of Population
Unemployment Rate
Note Index

-0.022***
0.134
-0.001
-0.837
-0.000
0.031
0.022***
0.248***
-0.016
0.047

Number of Obs.
Censored Obs.
Uncensored Obs.
Rho
Sigma
Lambda
Wald Chi2(10)

3,756
3,574
182
0.964
11.476
11.062
38.61***

0.004
0.104
0.009
0.600
0.000
0.020
0.007
0.075
0.031
0.066

Note: significance levels are indicated as * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (2-tailed)
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-5.17
1.29
-0.08
-1.39
-0.12
1.58
3.23
3.30
-0.51
0.71

The statistically significant coefficients on salary expenditures at both stages and
the significant coefficient on debt interest expenditures at the second stage suggest that a
city’s salary payment burden and debt interest payment burden exert obvious positive
influence on whether a city borrows short-term debt and how much it borrows. On
average, when a city’s salaries and wages paid to city employees as percentage of total
operating expenditures increases by 10 percentage points, the principal amount of notes
as percentage of total revenue rises by 3.6 percentage points. When a city’s debt interest
payment as percentage of total general fund operating expenditures increases by 10
percentage points, the principal amount of notes as percentage of total revenue rises by
5.9 percentage points. These findings provide evidence to support organization theorists’
argument that greater share of non-discretionary expenditure categories restrict a city’s
financial management flexibility and thus increases its dependence on short-term
borrowing.
The coefficient on the natural logarithm of population is positively significant
only at the first stage, suggesting that larger cities are more likely to issue cash
management notes, but the size of a city does not necessarily influence how much cash
management notes it needs to issue. The coefficients on charter cities are not significant
at either stage of Heckman estimation procedure. This suggests that issuing cash
management notes is not a financial management choice specifically associated with
charter cities. There is no obvious difference between charter cities and the general cities
regarding using short-term borrowing to manage their cash flows.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper examines factors that affect municipal governments’ short-term
borrowing, regarding the probability and amount of cash management notes issuance.
The finding that financial slack reduces a city’s probability to issue notes and the
principal amount of note issuance supports the modified pecking order theory’s claim:
when both internal financial resources (financial slack) and external financial resources
(short-term borrowing) are available, government financial officers prefer internal
financing to external financing. This study extends the application of pecking order
theory from firms and nonprofit organizations to local governments. The conclusion that
government financial officers also have a pecking order preference over public financial
resources further indicates that the modified pecking order theory can be used to analyze
government financial officers’ decision making in public finance and financial
management in future research.
The paper also finds that holding financial slack constant, non-discretionary
spending categories such as debt interest burden and salary burden increase a city’s
dependence on short-term borrowing. This is because non-discretionary spending
categories restrict financial managers’ flexibility in managing financial resources. When
confronted with financial challenges such as revenue shortfalls, municipal financial
managers with fewer available resources on hand have to rely on short-term borrowing.
This evidence supports Cyert and March (1963) and other organization theorists’ claim
that organizations exposed to more risk factors need more financial slack to hedge against
potential risks and uncertainties. Results from this study thus explain why municipal
governments accumulate financial slack, and to some extent, provide justification of
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municipal financial slack accumulation as a financial management strategy. Revenue
factors (i.e. intergovernmental revenue ratio and revenue diversification) do not appear to
exert any significant influence on municipal short-term borrowing in this study.
In all, this study finds evidence to support both the modified pecking order
theory’s claim on managers’ preference over financial resources and organization
theory’s slack-risk relationship. It improves our understanding of the roles of financial
slack in local government finance. Financial slack plays more than a countercyclical
expenditure stabilization role as discussed in Chapter Three of this dissertation and in a
few other studies (Marlowe 2005; Wang 2015). It may also improve local governments’
credit worthiness (Marlowe 2011). This study adds one more role of financial slack in
local government financial management: it serves as a convenient cash management tool
and reduces municipal governments’ reliance on short-term borrowing. Yet there is still a
tremendous gap in our understanding of local government slack accumulation, regarding
the rationales, the optimal level, and the impacts. This analysis was limited to a single
state. If data is available, future studies should examine local governments across states
and take account of fiscal, political, managerial, organizational, and economic factors.
Another limitation of this study is that it primarily examines the impacts of a city’s fiscal
structural factors on municipal government officials’ preference over internal and
external financial resources, without paying much attention to those political factors such
as forms of government, political conservatism, and party affiliation. The fiscal policy
space variable—charter city—captures some of the variations that political factors
explain because charter cities have greater political authorities such as the freedom to
choose forms of government, methods of election, voting requirements, and among
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others. Nevertheless, this dummy variable cannot capture the nuance of impacts of
particular political factors on municipal financial decision making. Future research
should overcome this limitation.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, I explore the role of financial slack in municipal finance. The
subject of study is of significant importance and policy relevance because municipal
governments are the layer of governments that are closest to citizens. In the past decade,
American cities have experienced an economic peak in 2007, an economic recession
between late 2007 and 2009, and economic recovery from 2010. During this turbulent
economic time, how cities managed their finances directly shape the outcomes of public
goods and service provision that matters to people’s daily life. In the management
literature, organization theorists posit that financial slack increases an organization’s
capacity in absorbing internal and external shocks. It offers managers more discretion to
respond to uncertainty. In the turbulent economic time when government officials face
more uncertainty in managing their cities’ revenues and expenditures, what roles does
financial slack play in municipal financial management?
Prior studies on how financial slack affects government management primarily
focus on financial slack’s expenditure stabilization role in state governments. Findings
from these studies have reached a relatively consistent conclusion that financial slack has
a counter-cyclical stabilization effect on state expenditures. Studies on financial slack’s
role in local governments are much scarce. The majority of these studies also focus on
financial slack’s expenditure stabilization role, but findings from these studies are mixed.
Some find that financial slack stabilizes local expenditures (Marlowe 2005; Wang 2015),
others do not find such effect (Hendrick 2006; Wang and Hou 2012). Almost all these
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studies at the local level use samples of cities (or counties) in one state or a particular
metropolitan area. Results from these studies have relatively low external validity. This
dissertation addresses the limitations in the current research on financial slack in
municipal finance.
The revenue chapter investigates whether tax revenue volatility contributes to
municipal financial slack accumulation. Based on a nationwide sample of cities, I use a
dynamic panel analysis approach to conduct the empirical analysis. I find that tax revenue
volatility as a risk factor increases a city’s financial slack level. In addition to this, other
risk factors in a city’s fiscal system such as non-discretionary expenditure categories also
contribute to municipal financial slack accumulation. These findings provide evidence to
support organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis. This chapter also provides important
descriptive information that improves our current understanding of financial slack
accumulation by American cities. It presents the national average municipal financial
slack level, the pro-cyclical trend of slack accumulation over the course of the business
cycles, and the regional differences in financial slack accumulation. The information
presents an overall picture of financial slack accumulation by American cities, providing
a basis for further assessment of financial slack’s roles in municipal finance.
The expenditure chapter examines whether financial slack stabilizes municipal
expenditures. Different from prior studies that focus on beginning-of-year financial
slack’s expenditure stabilization role in economic booms and busts, I examine this
question by looking at how the year-to-year change in financial slack affects the year-toyear change in municipal expenditures. Results suggest that financial slack absorbs
additional revenues when there is a revenue surplus and it release financial resources
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when there is a revenue shortfall. Changes in financial slack always counteract changes in
expenditures, thus financial slack smooths expenditure fluctuations. This study shifts the
research attention on financial slack from the macro perspective to a relatively micro
perspective. It dissects the mechanism of financial slack’s expenditure stabilization role
in municipal finance. Results from this study complement prior studies on financial
slack’s counter-cyclical expenditure stabilization.
The municipal securities chapter explores whether financial slack reduces
municipal short-term borrowing. Based on a sample of California cities, I use a Heckman
selection model to examine municipal governments’ preference over internal financial
resources (i.e. financial slack) and external financial resources (i.e. short-term
borrowing). Results show that financial slack reduces both the probability municipal
governments issue notes and the amount of notes issuance, suggesting that municipal
governments prefer internal financial resources to external financial resources. This
finding provides evidence to support the modified pecking order theory that governments,
like firms and nonprofit organizations, also have a preference ranking over internal and
external financial resources. This chapter is the first-known study that tests the
application of the modified pecking order theory from firms and nonprofit organizations
to local governments.
In summary, this dissertation is a comprehensive examination of municipal
financial slack, exploring both the determinants of financial slack accumulation and the
impacts of financial slack on municipal financial management. It covers three primary
subfields in municipal finance, namely, municipal revenues, municipal expenditures, and
municipal securities. Results from this dissertation complement prior studies on
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government financial slack, provide evidence to support some known theories, and
extend the application of theories in the government context. The next section discusses
the innovations and contributions of this dissertation.
5.2 Innovations and Contributions
5.2.1 Innovations
This dissertation is built on theories in a variety of fields. I draw theories from the
management literature, corporate and nonprofit finance, economics, and public finance,
and apply them to municipal governments. At the initial dissertation design stage, I
interviewed practitioners and researchers with experience in local government finance.
These interviews and discussions provide a foundation to assess financial slack’s roles in
municipal finance. Based on theories and practitioners’ perspectives, this dissertation
goes beyond the conventional research focus—financial slack’s expenditure stabilization
role. This dissertation explores both the determinants of municipal financial slack
accumulation and the impacts of financial slack on municipal financial performance and
decision-making.
I obtain information from a variety of sources, including the accounting
information from CAFRs, the revenue, expenditure, and debt information from the
Census Bureau, and the social economic information from various government agencies
and research institutes’ websites. I combine the information of various sources and create
a nationwide sample of cities. The nationwide sample of cities provides a venue to
observe the overall picture of financial slack accumulation by American cities. It also
significantly improves the external validity of the findings compared to prior studies.
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In each chapter, I carefully choose an appropriate research design and analytical
strategy based on the research question and the features of data structures. For example,
in the revenue chapter, I use a dynamic panel data analysis approach to address the
persistency of the dependent variable; in the expenditure chapter, I use the firstdifferenced equation model to examine how changes in the independent variable affect
the changes in the dependent variable; and in the municipal securities chapter, I use a
Heckman selection model to overcome the selection bias problem. The choice of
appropriate analytical strategies together with rigorous statistical checks guarantees the
robustness and reliability of results.
I attempt to approach the research questions from new perspectives rather than
simply follow other scholars’ research designs in prior studies. For example, in the
expenditure chapter, I shift the research focus from financial slack’s expenditure
stabilization effects in the business cycles to its stabilization effects on the year-to-year
expenditure adjustments. I also attempt to apply theories and hypotheses in other fields to
the context of municipal governments. For example, in the securities chapter, I apply the
modified pecking order theory which is often used in the studies of firms and nonprofit
organizations’ capital structures to the analysis of municipal governments’ preference on
internal and external financial resources. These attempts lead to research findings that
provide new perspectives to our understanding of financial slack’s roles in municipal
finance.
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5.2.2 Contributions
Theoretical Contributions
This dissertation improves our current understanding of financial slack beyond the
‘five percent’ rule of thumb and the GFOA’s recommended best practice. It provides
empirical evidence that a municipal government that faces more risk factors tend to
accumulate more financial slack. Although this dissertation does not find a formula to
assess the ‘appropriate’ financial slack level for individual cities, I believe these findings
provide some insight for future studies that dedicate to this research goal. Results from
this dissertation support Cyert and March (1963) and other organization theorists’ riskslack hypothesis: financial slack improves an organization’s capacity in respond to risks
and uncertainties, thus an organization that faces more risk factors accumulate more
financial slack. This finding suggests that municipal government officials accumulate
financial slack to prepare for future uncertainties. It improves our understanding of
government saving beyond public choice scholars’ assumption that governments are
slack-maximizing bureaucracies. Government financial slack accumulation is driven by
government officials’ intention to increase management capacity against future risks and
uncertainties. This finding helps us to better understand government financial resources
allocation between spending and saving.
This dissertation also improves our understanding of the roles of financial slack in
local government finance. Financial slack is not just a convenient tool to management
expenditure fluctuations, it also affects government credit ratings (Marlowe 2011), cash
flow management, and short-term borrowing. Financial slack may have other roles in
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local government finance awaiting researchers to explore. This dissertation pushes
towards that research direction.
Policy Implications
Besides the theoretical contributions, this dissertation carries valuable policy
implications in threefold. For municipal government officials, this dissertation provides
information of the national and regional average municipal financial slack levels which
help them to compare their cities financial slack levels with their peers. The findings that
risk factors affect municipal financial slack accumulation further help local officials to
assess the appropriateness of their cities’ financial slack level and decide their cities’
needs in financial slack accumulation. The findings that financial slack stabilizes
municipal expenditures and reduces municipal short-term borrowing inform municipal
government officials that financial slack is a convenient tool to manage expenditure
volatility and cash flows if not considering the intergenerational equity issue of the
taxpayers.
For state policy makers, this dissertation delivers a message that when making
policies to guide local fiscal practices, state policy makers should realize the importance
of financial slack in municipal finance. Most state governments use financial slack to
stabilize budgets and expenditures. Almost all state governments have established a
formal fund for this purpose. However, some state governments prohibit their local
governments from establishing or operating a formal stabilization fund. Some state
governments impose caps on the size of local general fund balance. These policies help
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state governments to better monitor and control local fiscal practices, but they also limit
the roles of financial slack in local financial management.
For citizens, this dissertation may help them better understand their local
governments’ financial choices and decisions. Governments are not the leviathans that by
nature desire to accumulate slack. Government financial slack accumulation is partially
driven by government officials’ intention to increase management capacity to respond to
future risks and uncertainties. In addition to a cushion against risks, financial slack is also
a convenient tool for government officials to manage expenditures and cash flows
because the use of UFB is under their discretion. I expect these findings provide citizens
another perspective to assess their local governments’ saving behavior and help them
make informed decisions when they need to vote for any amendment such as California’s
Proposition 13.
5.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions
This dissertation takes an organizational perspective and examines how financial
slack helps government officials manage municipal finances. It does not examine the
costs associated with financial slack accumulation. One such cost is the opportunity cost.
Holding valuable financial resources as financial slack increases municipal governments’
capacity in coping with potential risks in the future, but at the same time, municipal
governments lose the chance to use these resources to address current issues if there are
any. This reflects the tradeoff between increasing future capacity and addressing current
needs. Other costs include inefficiency, satisficing, and agency problems concerned by
public choice scholars. Researchers have found that nonprofits with large endowments
tend to show agency problems between managers and donors. Many of such nonprofits
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pay higher salaries to their managers and spend less on programs (Core, Guay, and Verdi
2006). Do municipal governments with more financial slack also pay more to elected
officials (e.g. mayors, city managers, chief financial officers, etc.) or have greater
administrative costs? This dissertation examines the effectiveness of financial slack as a
management tool in municipal finance, but it does not address the efficiency problem.
Without a full assessment of costs and benefits, effectiveness and efficiency, I cannot
make a strong policy recommendation that financial slack is a good management tool for
local governments. This is the limitation of this dissertation, but it also indicates the great
research potential of local government financial slack in the future.
Another limitation of the dissertation is the lack of political factors. Most prior
studies on municipal financial slack incorporate more or less political factors, and
researchers find that some political factors such as forms of government and political
conservatism have significant impacts on local financial performance and decision
making (Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2005). All of these studies that incorporate political
factors as control variables analyze samples of cities in one state or one metropolitan
area. For a study that uses a nationwide sample of cities, it is quite challenging to
incorporate political factors due to lack of data. Adding the state-level aggregated
political factors to the models does not address this issue well because the state-level
aggregated variables cannot capture the variations of impacts imposed by these political
factors on individual cities. Nevertheless, the lack of political factors does not bias the
empirical estimations because the generalized methods-of-moment model and the firstdifferenced equation model both remove the time-invariant factors of each individual
cities. Most of the political factors (e.g. forms of government, political conservatism, etc.)
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can be considered as roughly time-invariant during a nine-year period. Despite there is
not much concern on estimation bias due to lack of political factors, future studies should
still attempt to incorporate possible political factors so that we will be able to observe
how a particular political factor affects municipal governments’ financial slack
accumulation and financial decision making.
This dissertation reveals that financial slack is not just an expenditure stabilization
tool. It plays a lot more roles in municipal finance yet to be explored. Marlowe (2011)
sets a good example by studying how financial slack affects local governments’ credit
ratings. This dissertation also demonstrates an intention to explore financial slack’s
complex roles. To improve our understanding of financial slack and to make it an
effective and efficient policy tools, future studies should follow this path to explore the
various roles financial slack plays in local government finance, anticipated and
unanticipated, positive and negative.
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